Understanding the Air War Over Ukraine: Strategy, Systems, and Struggles

How the Air War Over Ukraine Began

Retired naval aviator Ward Carroll interviewed Justin Bronk, a senior fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, to explore the origins and evolution of the air war over Ukraine. According to Bronk, the early phase of the air campaign unfolded along more predictable lines, yet showcased significant discrepancies in performance. "Russia deeply underperformed," he noted, falling far short of the capabilities that military analysts in the West had anticipated based on Russia's extensive arsenal.

Bronk explained that the initial stages of the war were defined by the inability of either side to operate effectively near the front lines due to the dense layers of ground-based air defense systems deployed by both Russia and Ukraine. For Ukraine, this meant adapting a previously concentrated air defense strategy, which had been primarily aimed at the Donbas region, to address a four-pronged Russian offensive across a significantly wider front.

On the Russian side, roughly a week into the conflict, their considerable inventory of air defense systems, including systems like the S-400 and S-300V4, formed an effective airspace shield. This network also included fighter patrols with aircraft such as the Su-35, Su-30, and occasionally the MiG-31, particularly over Crimea. Supporting this setup were numerous medium-range air defense systems, many of which were mobilized alongside Russian ground forces advancing into Ukraine. This layered air defense created a high-threat environment, forcing Ukrainian air operations into a defensive posture early on.

While Ukrainian forces were able to exploit some logistical confusion in the early days of the invasion to conduct significant ground-attack missions, notably using Su-24 and Su-25 aircraft and even MiG-29 fighters equipped with rockets, these efforts were unsustainable. Bronk remarked that the operation of the Ukrainian Air Force quickly boiled down to a struggle for survival. More unexpectedly, he said, was Russia’s failure to establish air superiority and significantly weaken Ukraine's robust integrated air defense network, a pre-war asset that was among the largest in Europe. This system, relatively well-stocked at the outset with six months' worth of ammunition for intense combat, allowed Ukraine to resist sustained aerial attacks during the early phases.

The arrival of Western air defense systems such as Patriot missiles toward the end of 2022 marked a shift. Initially, Ukraine had relied solely on its Soviet-era S-300V systems for ballistic missile defense, which were limited in number and capability. Additionally, Ukraine received help from allied countries, which procured Soviet-era surface-to-air missile (SAM) ammunition from former Eastern Bloc nations to sustain their defenses. However, as the conflict progressed, the extensive use of these legacy systems, coupled with targeted Russian attacks on Ukrainian air defense positions, gradually depleted Ukraine’s pre-war SAM inventory.

The Evolution of Air Defense Systems and Long-Range Strikes

Bronk analyzed the significant changes in air defense strategies and capabilities over the course of the war. As the conflict extended into its later years, both Ukraine and Russia faced challenges in maintaining their air defense postures amid sustained long-range strike campaigns. Russia ramped up its use of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and one-way attack drones in massive waves, while Ukraine engaged in escalating long-range drone strikes, often involving hundreds of drones per attack wave, several times a week.

This evolution presented a serious problem for Ukraine. As Bronk explained, the depletion of its Soviet-era air defense systems placed immense pressure on the country to secure replacements. Over time, Ukraine transitioned to employing smaller numbers of Western air defense systems, such as Patriot, NASAMS, and IRIS-T. These systems, while more advanced, were not available in sufficient quantities to replicate the extensive pre-war coverage. To compensate, Ukraine relied heavily on improvisation, such as creatively adapting short-range systems for counter-drone operations and leveraging domestically produced systems.

Meanwhile, the effectiveness of the Russian air defense network also began to show signs of strain due to these long-range attacks. Russia had to divert its air defense assets from frontline areas to shield strategic infrastructure such as oil refineries and major urban centers like Moscow. Bronk noted the visible dispersal of Russian air defenses across a vast geographic area, diluting the density of coverage along the front lines. This created slightly more maneuvering room for both Ukrainian and Russian combat aviation near the front, though the overall risk remained high due to the formidable remaining defenses. Significantly, while Russia continues to manufacture new air defense systems, Ukraine's reliance on foreign support to replenish its stockpiles highlights a sobering logistical disparity.

Bronk also discussed how the shift in air defense tasks has influenced wider operational strategies. The technological limitations of drones and outdated fighters on both sides have forced adaptations. For example, fourth-generation Russian Su-34 strike aircraft now launch glide bombs from distances of 60 to 70 kilometers behind their own lines, thus exposing themselves to considerably less risk. As these aerial and missile threats continue to evolve, Bronk pointed out that meeting them requires scaled-up production and procurement of cost-effective solutions for both nations.

Operational Challenges and Key Battles in Air Combat

Justin Bronk, an expert in military aviation, emphasizes the toll that the Ukrainian air force faces in trying to counter Russia's aerial operations. He highlights that the attrition of Russian aircraft, including their so-called stealth fighters, has slightly improved conditions for Ukrainian aircraft near the front lines, as Russia reallocates air defenses to address increasing one-way drone attacks deep within its territory.

This shift in dynamics has created somewhat more operational flexibility for Ukraine near the front lines. Russian fighters, including the Su-57, are reportedly frequently engaged in defending against Ukraine's relentless deployment of one-way attack drones deep into Russian-controlled areas. This focus on drone defense has potentially reduced Russia's presence over the front lines to some extent, giving Ukraine greater latitude to conduct certain operations closer to contested zones. However, the high tempo of attacks from both sides continues to place enormous pressure on equipment and personnel.

Bronk indicates a strategic focus from both nations to address this pressure. Ukraine's measures include multi-layered defenses that aim to handle threats at varying distances, thereby minimizing strain on high-value systems like Patriot missile batteries, which are best reserved for countering more sophisticated threats like ballistic missiles. Russia, on the other hand, has concentrated short- and medium-range defenses along front-line areas and prioritized key strategic infrastructure deep within its large territory, including oil refineries, military bases, and command centers. The broad expanse of Russia poses logistical challenges for an omnipresent air defense network, leaving some areas vulnerable to Ukrainian drones and missile strikes.

Bronk further discusses the difficulty in engaging small, slow-moving drones effectively. While lasers and infrared-guided weapons have emerged as practical solutions, they are resource-intensive to deploy at scale. This highlights one of the defining operational challenges of modern air warfare: the sheer scale and persistence of air campaigns require balancing sophisticated, high-cost systems with more readily available, cost-effective solutions, all while managing finite pilot availability and hardware limitations.

Innovative Air Defense Techniques and Tactical Adaptations

Bronk outlines several of the innovative methods Ukraine has employed to confront the growing threats posed by Russian drones, cruise missiles, and other aerial threats. At the core of Ukraine's strategy is the deployment of hundreds of mobile air defense teams, which are typically equipped with a mix of weaponry. These teams often consist of vehicles with short-range radar-guided anti-aircraft cannon systems like the ZSU-23-4 Shilka or similar platforms. These systems are particularly effective against low-cost drones and even cruise missiles when they pass through their short-range engagement zones. However, many other mobile air defense teams operate with lighter arms such as heavy machine guns mounted on pickup trucks, small-caliber cannons, and shoulder-launched man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) such as the Stinger missile.

To complement their traditional defenses, Ukraine has employed an arsenal of improvised drone interceptors. Many of these systems are built around 3D-printed frames, along with inexpensive, commercially available components like Chinese-made motors and electronics. Bronk explains that the combat utility of these interceptors is further enhanced by incorporating machine learning algorithms for terminal guidance. This is crucial for effectively targeting small, fast-moving drones, as manual remote control becomes challenging due to delays in signal transmission when the interceptors approach their targets.

One of the critical aspects of Ukraine's defense strategy is positioning these mobile air defense teams and drone interceptor units in dense, multi-layered belts stretching tens of kilometers from frontline areas to the deeper regions of the country. These belts act as a high-density protective layer, giving Ukrainian forces a greater probability of intercepting enemy drones and missiles before they reach high-value targets like cities, industrial centers, and energy infrastructure. Bronk points out that this network of mobile air defenses maximizes coverage, making it challenging for Russia to overwhelm defenses with mass drone launches, with attrition occurring at multiple layers before targets are reached.

The goal of this “multilayered defense shield” is not just to neutralize incoming threats but also to optimize resource allocation. High-value systems like the Patriot missile batteries are prioritized for engaging complex and more dangerous threats, such as ballistic missiles. Medium-range air defense platforms like NASAMS are used for cruise missiles when necessary, though efficiency dictates conserving these systems as much as possible. This approach helps to balance the use of Ukraine's limited advanced air defense resources while utilizing cost-effective alternatives for more frequent, smaller-scale threats.

The Russian side employs a similar mix of defense systems, but its strategies differ notably. Unlike the Ukrainians, who rely on mobile defense teams and distributed operations, the Russian air defense strategy is concentrated near critical assets, leaving vast areas more vulnerable to attack, particularly from drones. Moreover, while Russia has substantial short- and medium-range air defenses, it also faces mounting strain on its defenses and resources as the conflict grinds on.

Bronk goes on to discuss the implications of Ukraine’s innovative air defense methods for other militaries, particularly smaller or less-resourced forces that cannot field advanced fighter fleets. He suggests that low-cost drone-hunting initiatives, such as equipping turboprop aircraft with machine guns and simpler targeting systems designed specifically to engage one-way attack drones, could offer a viable alternative for these nations. Such adaptations could relieve the operational burden on fighter jet fleets, allowing them to be used more effectively for higher-priority missions. However, he cautions that while Ukraine's approach of deploying massed mobile air defense teams has proven effective, replicating this model in other contexts would be challenging, especially for nations with smaller or entirely professional armies. The sheer personnel and logistical requirements for such an effort would be prohibitive for most militaries, including some in NATO.

Helicopters, too, have shown promise in countering drone threats. Bronk notes that countries like Israel have utilized attack helicopters like the AH-64 Apache to great effect in intercepting one-way attack drones, using both machine guns and precision-guided munitions such as Hellfire missiles. However, relying on helicopters or fighters comes with associated risks and high operational costs. The ongoing challenge for Ukraine, and for other nations learning from this conflict, thus remains finding a balance between deploying effective defenses and conserving limited resources in a way that allows for sustained operations over long-term conflicts.

What was said, and when

The points this article makes, and the moment in the recording where each was said. Every time below opens the recording at that moment.

• Ward Carroll interviewed Justin Bronk regarding the origins and evolution of the air war over Ukraine. 00:44.
• Justin Bronk stated that Russia significantly underperformed in the early air campaign compared to Western analysts' expectations. 01:18.
• Neither side was able to operate effectively near the front lines due to dense ground-based air defense systems. 01:18.
• Ukraine adapted its air defense strategy to address a broader front due to a four-pronged Russian offensive. 03:28.
• Russian air defenses, including the S-400 and S-300V4 systems, formed an airspace shield roughly a week into the conflict. 03:54.
• Fighter aircraft like the Su-35, Su-30, and MiG-31 patrolled Crimea as part of the Russian air defense network. 04:07.
• Medium-range air defense systems accompanied advancing Russian ground forces. 04:54.
• Ukraine used Su-24, Su-25 aircraft and MiG-29 fighters equipped with rockets for significant ground-attack missions early in the invasion. 04:38.
• Ukraine's integrated air defense network was relatively well-stocked at the outset with six months' worth of ammunition. 05:22.
• Western air defense systems like Patriot missiles arrived in Ukraine toward the end of 2022. 05:36.
• Ukraine initially relied solely on Soviet-era S-300V systems for ballistic missile defense. 05:36.
• Former Eastern Bloc nations provided Soviet-era surface-to-air missile ammunition to Ukraine. 05:51.
• Ukraine transitioned to using Western systems such as Patriot, NASAMS, and IRIS-T for air defense. 07:26.
• Ukraine employs improvisation such as adapting short-range systems for counter-drone operations and developing domestically produced systems. 19:14.
• Russia had to divert air defense assets to protect strategic infrastructure due to long-range Ukrainian drone strikes. 07:54.
• Russian Su-34 aircraft launch glide bombs from distances of 60 to 70 kilometers behind their lines. 17:21.
• Russian air defenses have been dispersed geographically due to long-range attacks. 07:14.
• Ukraine uses multi-layered defenses to minimize strain on high-value systems like Patriot batteries. 25:31.
• Russia prioritizes short- and medium-range defenses near front-line areas and key strategic infrastructure. 27:20.
• Justin Bronk emphasized operational pressures on Ukrainian air force personnel and equipment. 10:00.
• Ukraine deploys mobile air defense teams equipped with radar-guided systems like ZSU-23-4 Shilka or lighter weapons like mounted machine guns. 32:09.
• Ukraine employs drone interceptors built using 3D-printed frames and commercially available components incorporating machine learning. 22:42.
• Ukraine positions mobile air defenses in dense belts stretching tens of kilometers from the frontline to deep regions. 23:21.
• Patriot missile batteries are prioritized for engaging ballistic missiles in Ukraine's strategy. 25:31.
• Russia concentrates its air defense strategy near critical assets, leaving other areas more vulnerable. 27:16.
• Russia and Ukraine face logistical strain on air defense resources due to prolonged conflict. 27:31.
• Justin Bronk suggested using turboprop aircraft equipped with machine guns as alternatives for drone defense. 32:59.
• Israel has employed attack helicopters like AH-64 Apache to counter drone threats effectively. 32:36.