Understanding the Ford-Class Carrier Program: Cost, Criticism, and Strategic Shifts

The Ford-class aircraft carrier program was conceived as a replacement for the aging Nimitz-class carriers, aimed at serving as the backbone of U.S. naval power. As host Ward Carroll underscores, its development represents an ambitious leap forward in design and technology. This class of carriers integrates cutting-edge systems like the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) and advanced weapons elevators. These innovations are designed to enhance operational efficiency, safety, and the Navy's overall capability in projecting power globally. However, this evolution has come with significant challenges: unprecedented cost overruns, delays in deployment timelines, and growing scrutiny from critics, including prominent political figures.

Carroll begins by contextualizing the discussion with a reference to recent remarks from former President Donald Trump, who has repeatedly criticized the Ford class. Carroll reminds listeners that Trump has a history of targeting specific Ford-class features, most notably, the electromagnetic technologies, such as EMALS, which have replaced traditional steam catapults. Citing Trump’s speech at the Pennsylvania Defense Innovation Summit, Carroll recounts Trump’s anecdotes about visiting a shipyard and questioning the efficacy of the electric systems. Trump described a conversation with a longtime catapult manufacturer who allegedly expressed a preference for steam catapults over electric ones, emphasizing their simpler repair and maintenance requirements. According to Trump’s remarks, the electric systems are overly complicated and unreliable, requiring specialized expertise for repairs, which may delay critical operations.

Trump didn’t stop there. He also criticized the decision to use magnets for the new weapons elevators, arguing that traditional hydraulic systems would have been a more robust and logical choice. He voiced concerns about the reliability of magnets in harsh operational environments, highlighting potential failures due to water exposure or extreme weather. Trump even took issue with the fundamental structural changes in the design of the Ford class, zeroing in on the placement of the captain’s bridge and the location of ammunition below critical areas like the bridge tower. For Trump, these decisions reflected what he called “common sense” failures and were emblematic of wasteful spending, with the program exceeding its original budget by billions of dollars.

The podcast also replays the comments of Derek Murphy, Vice President of New Carrier Construction at Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII), addressing these concerns. Murphy explains that the Ford-class design is fundamentally centered around the integration of its electromagnetic systems. For example, EMALS components are distributed across multiple levels of the ship, making a switch back to steam-based catapult systems not only impractical but nearly impossible without a complete redesign of the vessels. According to Murphy, the design and construction process represents a massive logistical effort involving material procurement, intricate engineering, and coordinated operations such as assembling blocks and performing “superlifts” to piece the ship together. Any major changes, such as reverting to steam catapults or hydraulic elevators, would require substantial effort and delays, as a great deal of planning revolves around the precise engineering and material requirements for these systems.

Carroll highlights this complexity further by pointing to the Navy’s existing construction timelines, which underline the significant duration needed to bring a Ford-class carrier from initial procurement to operational status. For example, USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), the first ship of the class, required roughly 14 years to move from procurement in 2008 to initial operational readiness in late 2021. The Kennedy (CVN 79) and Doris Miller (CVN 81) are each on comparable trajectories, with the Kennedy set for delivery in 2025 and the Doris Miller expected to join the fleet by 2032. Meanwhile, delays have already pushed the Enterprise (CVN 80) and Doris Miller behind schedule.

Carroll also points out that the program’s challenges are magnified by budgetary constraints and mounting political scrutiny. The FY2025 budget request earmarks significant funding for the completion of the Kennedy, Enterprise, and Doris Miller while delaying the procurement of CVN 82, the fifth ship in the Ford class. Furthermore, no funding has been allocated for additional Ford-class carriers beyond CVN 83, raising questions about the future scale and structure of the U.S. Navy’s super-aircraft carrier fleet. If the current plans move forward without additional funding, the U.S. could face a scenario in the 2040s where the number of operational carriers is reduced below the Navy’s stated requirement of 11, with only nine carriers in service, most of them Ford-class.

The transition from the Nimitz class to the Ford class further complicates matters. With early Nimitz-class carriers such as the USS Nimitz now beginning decommissioning in 2026, the Navy faces a temporary drop in its carrier inventory until replacement Ford-class carriers are fully operational. For instance, the USS Eisenhower is expected to retire shortly before the Enterprise is ready in 2029. This problem underscores the intricate balance the Navy must maintain between decommissioning aging vessels and ramping up production timelines for new ones.

In summing up this portion of the discussion, Carroll emphasizes the significant financial, political, and operational implications of the Ford-class program’s challenges. He notes that these realities have prompted a broader debate about the role of aircraft carriers in modern warfare, especially against evolving strategic threats like cyberattacks, hypersonic missiles, and anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities. As the Navy grapples with these issues and contemplates the future of its carrier program, the fate of the Ford-class remains central to discussions about U.S. naval and military strategy.

Technological Innovations in the Ford-Class Design

Retired naval aviator Ward Carroll highlights several groundbreaking technological innovations integrated into the Ford-class aircraft carriers, which are designed to improve efficiency, safety, and operational capabilities. A pivotal advancement is the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS), which replaces the traditional steam-powered catapults used to launch aircraft. Carroll explains that the switch to EMALS is not merely a superficial upgrade but a complete overhaul of the system, requiring entirely different infrastructure and engineering. This change aims to enhance aircraft launch precision and reduce wear on both the aircraft and the catapult systems.

Another focal point of innovation is the advanced weapons elevators, which are designed to transport munitions from storage to the flight deck with unprecedented speed and safety. Carroll recounts an anecdote illustrating the importance of elevator improvements, drawing lessons from the USS Franklin, a WWII-era carrier that sustained catastrophic damage partly due to having bombs stored on its hangar deck. The Ford-class design addresses such historical pitfalls, ensuring that munitions are stowed below deck and can be moved quickly to operational areas. While early tests of the elevators were beset by difficulties, these issues have gradually been resolved, as evidenced during recent deployments.

The value of these innovations was on display during the Ford’s 11-month deployment, labeled by the Navy as historic and successful. The carrier operated in multiple theaters, including the Atlantic, Mediterranean, Caribbean, Red Sea, and Arabian Gulf regions. Carroll notes the impressive operational statistics: the air wing flew thousands of sorties and logged significant flight hours, while the crew completed numerous at-sea resupply missions. These achievements demonstrate the potential of technologies like EMALS to support high-intensity operations. That said, Carroll acknowledges initial problems with the platform, such as frequent toilet clogs and a significant fire in the laundry room that temporarily displaced some of the crew. These logistical challenges underscored the difficulties of transitioning to a cutting-edge carrier design.

Cost and Criticism: A Breakdown

Ward Carroll turns to the financial aspects of the Ford-class carrier program, shedding light on why it has faced significant criticism. From the outset, cost overruns have been a central concern. The program's original budget projections were far exceeded, fueling debates in political and defense circles. Critics argue that some of the new technologies, including EMALS, were overly ambitious and costly compared to proven but less advanced alternatives like steam catapults. However, Carroll observes that even some of the program’s harshest critics, including former President Donald Trump, appear to rely on outdated information when levying criticisms. For instance, during the presidency of Donald Trump, there was a notable call for reverting to older, steam-powered systems, which Carroll asserts would be infeasible given the new ship design and infrastructure requirements.

Carroll also highlights a broader issue of industrial and logistical constraints that have played a major role in program costs and delays. Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII), the only shipbuilder currently capable of producing carriers like the Ford, faces its own challenges, including workforce shortages exacerbated by delays in contracts and the COVID-19 pandemic. Additionally, the procurement of highly specialized materials, which can take years to source and manufacture, has further extended timelines. Carroll underscores that the intricate nature of carrier construction makes it impossible to rapidly adjust production or scale up without long-term investments in industrial capacity. This process could take decades.

In weighing the Chinese progress in developing advanced carriers, Carroll draws attention to the Fujian class being built in China. He notes that while these ships are constructed at a faster pace and potentially lower cost, they do not match the Ford class in terms of operational capabilities or technological sophistication. The inclusion of systems like EMALS in Chinese designs, however, indicates their recognition of the technology's value, even if some American critics remain unconvinced by its benefits.

Carroll also delves into the political dimensions of the cost debates. He explains how funding battles between Congress and the Pentagon rest on a delicate balance of ensuring adequate defense capabilities while addressing budgetary constraints. Legislators often have competing priorities, including bringing jobs and resources to their districts, which can lead to decisions driven more by local economic considerations than military strategy. He points out that this is not a new phenomenon, citing examples from past administrations where defense spending became a political bargaining chip.

Despite the criticisms, Carroll emphasizes that the Ford-class carriers have shown resilience and adaptability during their initial deployment. Their performance has validated a number of the technological innovations that had initially drawn skepticism and opposition. Nonetheless, fiscal scrutiny and political wrangling remain key obstacles for the long-term continuity of the program.

Deployment and Performance of Ford-Class Carriers

Retired naval aviator Ward Carroll explains that the USS Gerald R. Ford recently concluded a historic deployment, showcasing its capabilities and addressing prior skepticism of the Ford-class program. During its deployment, the carrier effectively tackled the challenges of modern semi-asymmetric warfare, proving its utility in diverse operational theaters, including areas of tension such as those influenced by Iran and Venezuela. Carroll highlights that while these nations do not present the same level of threats as China or Russia, their asymmetrical tactics still demand significant capabilities to ensure regional stability. Aircraft carriers, he argues, remain crucial in meeting the needs of combatant commands such as Central Command (CENTCOM) and Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).

A key takeaway from the Ford's deployment was the validation of its capacity to execute advanced military operations. Carroll notes the importance of carrier strike groups for missions that require constant readiness in semi-asymmetrical theaters. For example, he mentions recent operations in the Red Sea, Caribbean, and northern Arabian Sea, all areas where tensions demand persistent military presence. He contrasts today’s deployments with those of the Vietnam War era, pointing out the differences in operational tempo and the availability of port access. Unlike the Vietnam era, where more carriers were deployed but with frequent port visits, carriers like the USS Abraham Lincoln and USS George H.W. Bush today remain on long deployments without significant rest stops, ensuring operational coverage in critical zones.

The Ford-class carriers and their predecessors have demonstrated a sustained ability to generate high sortie rates and deliver targeted strikes efficiently. Carroll highlights successes in operations involving precision weaponry like Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSMs and JASSM-ERs) and long-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). However, he contends that the ability to conduct precision strikes ceases to be strategically relevant if the enemy's strategy is simply to endure protracted conflict, as seen in engagements against groups like the Taliban. This underscores the challenge of aligning tactical success with overarching strategic objectives in modern theaters of war.

Carroll also discusses how personnel retention directly influences carrier operations. With some deployments stretching up to 11 or 12 months, sailors often leave the service mid-career, contributing to significant challenges in maintaining readiness. He emphasizes that external job opportunities in sectors like aviation and technology compound the Navy's issues in retaining skilled personnel. Carroll warns that this ongoing retention crisis extends its repercussions beyond current conflicts and into future wars.

Challenges Ahead for the Ford-Class Program

Carroll delves into the pressing concerns facing the Ford-class program, starting with the strain on naval resources in the face of increasing global commitments. He explains that the U.S. Navy currently operates 11 aircraft carriers, yet only a few are available for deployment to hot spots at any given time. To maintain the necessary global presence, Carroll argues, the Navy requires at least 15 carriers. However, with funding stagnating, he warns that the planned fleet might dwindle over time. By the mid-21st century, Carroll projects that the Navy will be left with just four operational Ford-class carriers, drastically reducing its ability to maintain a strong international presence.

He acknowledges that critics often view carriers as relics in an era moving towards unmanned systems and evolving warfare technologies. However, history provides a counter-argument, Carroll asserts, pointing to misjudgments made about the relevance of battleships and aircraft in previous decades. He believes that, just as nuclear weaponry didn’t render conventional forces obsolete after World War II, carriers will continue to serve critical functions in deterring aggression, containing hostile regimes, and maintaining global stability for the foreseeable future.

Personnel retention also stands out as a key concern. Carroll reports that prolonged deployments take a toll on morale, with long missions increasing the likelihood of service members leaving the Navy for more stable private-sector opportunities. He highlights that senior leaders like Representative Kagan from Virginia’s 2nd District have noted this issue, recently advocating for better support for personnel and investment in infrastructure like naval bases and housing.

To address these challenges, Carroll reiterates the importance of maintaining a sustainable fleet size and improving living conditions for service members. He also mentions the concept of affordable bulk, a procurement strategy advocated by defense expert Paco Bonitz of The Merge. This strategy focuses on sourcing cost-effective, mass-produced systems that minimize the strain on military budgets while meeting operational demands. Carroll considers this an essential adjustment in ensuring that the Ford-class program continues to deliver strategic value.

Carroll closes by emphasizing the need to address future geopolitical challenges, particularly the growing ambitions of nations like China. He references China's potential focus on achieving military goals, such as capturing Taiwan, by their so-called "Davidson window," which may open in the near future. Carroll underscores the importance of proactive planning and procurement to maintain U.S. military superiority. While acknowledging that the Navy will face stiff budgetary and logistical challenges, he remains optimistic about the strategic advantages provided by the Ford-class carriers and the broader capability of American military forces.

What was said, and when

The points this article makes, and the moment in the recording where each was said. Every time below opens the recording at that moment.

• The Ford-class aircraft carrier program was conceived as a replacement for the aging Nimitz-class carriers. 15:13.
• The Ford-class program integrates systems like the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) and advanced weapons elevators. 17:17.
• Critics, including former President Donald Trump, have questioned features of the Ford-class program. 05:37.
• Trump criticized the electromagnetic technologies including EMALS in the Ford-class program. 03:48.
• Trump described a conversation with a longtime catapult manufacturer preferring steam catapults over electric ones. 05:37.
• Trump criticized the use of magnets for new weapons elevators over hydraulic systems. 06:25.
• Trump raised concerns about structural changes in the design of the Ford class like the placement of the captain’s bridge. 07:50.
• The Ford-class program exceeded its original budget by billions of dollars. 05:34.
• EMALS components are distributed across multiple levels of the ship. 11:56.
• USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), the first Ford-class ship, required roughly 14 years to move from procurement in 2008 to operational readiness in late 2021. 15:35.
• The Kennedy (CVN 79) is set for delivery in 2025. 15:59.
• The Doris Miller (CVN 81) is expected to join the fleet by 2032. 15:59.
• Delays have pushed the Enterprise (CVN 80) and Doris Miller behind schedule. 19:39.
• The FY2025 budget request earmarks significant funding for the completion of specific Ford-class carriers while delaying CVN 82 procurement. 15:13.
• Funding issues could reduce the U.S. operational carriers below the Navy’s stated requirement of 11 to nine carriers in service by the 2040s. 15:35.
• Early Nimitz-class carriers such as USS Nimitz will begin decommissioning in 2026. 17:37.
• USS Eisenhower is expected to retire shortly before the Enterprise is ready in 2029. 17:54.
• USS Gerald R. Ford conducted an 11-month deployment showcasing its capabilities in regions including the Atlantic, Mediterranean, Caribbean, Red Sea, and Arabian Gulf. 21:27.
• The Ford-class carrier air wing flew thousands of sorties during its deployment. 25:34.
• The USS Gerald R. Ford encountered problems including toilet clogs and a fire in the laundry room during its deployment. 26:38.
• The Ford-class program faced initial challenges with advanced weapons elevators. 23:42.
• The program has faced significant cost overruns from its original budget projections. 05:23.
• Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII) is the only shipbuilder capable of producing Ford-class carriers. 17:17.
• HII faced workforce shortages exacerbated by delays and the COVID-19 pandemic. 37:45.
• Carroll noted that the Fujian class in China does not match the Ford class in operational capabilities or sophistication. 34:25.
• The Navy operates 11 aircraft carriers, but Carroll argues it requires at least 15 carriers to maintain global presence. 54:01.
• Prolonged deployments have led to personnel retention challenges in the Navy. 56:27.
• Representative Kagan advocated for better support and investment in infrastructure for personnel. 53:06.
• Carroll projected that by mid-21st century, the Navy might operate just 4 operational Ford-class carriers. 18:44.
• China’s military ambitions, such as achieving goals by the "Davidson window," pose challenges needing proactive planning and procurement. 1:02:22.