The End of Europe’s FCAS Program and the Future of Sixth-Generation Fighters

What Defines a Sixth-Generation Fighter?

Perun begins by explaining that while the terminology behind fighter generations isn't universal and often exploited for marketing purposes, there are some broadly accepted criteria for what defines a sixth-generation fighter. He notes that countries and companies often label their fourth-generation aircraft with "fourth-generation plus" or similar terms to indicate the integration of modern features. However, there remain clear distinctions when it comes to defining a true sixth-generation fighter.

According to Perun, such a fighter must feature advanced stealth capabilities for survivability in highly contested environments. Additionally, these aircraft are expected to mark a significant technological leap forward in terms of sensors, computing power, electrical output, and cooling systems. The emphasis is not only on performance but also on the ability to function as part of a broader "system of systems."

One of the most critical aspects, Perun emphasizes, is the integration of air combat drones as collaborative platforms in air missions. These drones would not just support the crewed aircraft in combat but also act as extensions of their sensory and attack capabilities. In this emerging "teaming era" of aerial warfare, the sixth-generation fighter essentially becomes a high-tech command center in the skies, with humans orchestrating a network of semi-autonomous drones.

However, such a monumental design ambition comes at a price, both financial and technological. Developing a sixth-generation fighter means not only designing a state-of-the-art aircraft but also building and integrating its associated components, such as drones and advanced networking architectures, into an interoperable system.

Perun points out that prior to this new generation, a debate existed around whether further development of crewed fighters was necessary as drone capabilities rapidly expanded. The prevailing conclusion among major military powers has been affirmative. Existing fighter fleets remain reliant on aging designs, and drones alone are not yet capable of replacing the situational awareness and decision-making abilities of human pilots. As a result, most nations with advanced air forces have committed to building at least one more fighter generation, with crewed aircraft remaining central to these plans.

Nonetheless, as Perun adds, the challenge of actually designing and producing these next-generation aircraft remains immense, even for nations with strong defense industries. He identifies the three major components of a successful fighter program: sufficient funding, political will to allocate resources, and technical expertise. Historically, only a small number of countries, primarily the United States and China, have demonstrated the ability to develop such advanced aircraft independently. For other nations, collaboration or reliance on existing designs has often been necessary to meet these challenges.

The Ambitious Goals of the Franco-German-Spanish FCAS Program

Perun then shifts focus to the now-defunct Franco-German-Spanish Future Combat Air System (FCAS) program, also known as SCAF (Système de Combat Aérien du Futur) in French. Initially, FCAS was envisioned as a hallmark of European cooperation. France and Germany joined forces in 2017, motivated by the prohibitively high costs and complexity of developing a next-generation fighter independently. Spain later joined in 2019, further solidifying the international scope of the project.

The program aimed to create a state-of-the-art sixth-generation combat system. This ambitious effort would have included not only a next-generation fighter but also a suite of advanced technologies, such as a unified combat cloud, system-wide networking capabilities for seamless communication, and a system of drones working in tandem with the manned aircraft for enhanced air combat operations. By sharing resources, expertise, and costs, the FCAS program was intended to provide greater strategic autonomy for European nations, reducing reliance on external defense players like the United States.

Perun highlights how the European approach to the program differed from the models pursued by other global military powers. While many countries, including the United States and China, focused on advanced, reusable air combat drones, the FCAS program initially emphasized the development of lightweight, cost-effective "remote carriers." These missile-sized drones, designed to be launched from manned aircraft or even cargo planes, could carry various payloads, from sensors and jammers to offensive munitions. Although less reusable and sustainable than American concepts like the Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA), the European approach aimed for scalability and the generation of mass for large-scale engagements.

Over time, however, Perun notes that the FCAS program began to incorporate concepts resembling more sophisticated and reusable drones, akin to the American CCAs. By 2022, Airbus had unveiled a larger, reusable drone concept capable of hosting modular payloads. Despite this progress, the core of the FCAS initiative remained its manned sixth-generation fighter, intended to replace the Dassault Rafale for France and the Eurofighter Typhoon for Germany, while potentially complementing Spain's fleet.

Perun underscores the strong industrial foundation of the FCAS program, with notable contributions from companies such as Dassault, Airbus, Indra, and MBDA, the latter known for its missile expertise. France brought its experience from the development of the Rafale, while Germany contributed its industrial capacity and financial support. Spain added its capabilities to the mix, rounding out a coalition of European nations that appeared, on paper, to possess the necessary resources and expertise to succeed.

Still, Perun highlights that even from its inception, the program faced questions about whether it could deliver on its promises. Complex industrial arrangements, political sensitivities around workshare, and divergent national priorities loomed large. These challenges, he suggests, set the stage for the eventual unraveling of FCAS, as will be explored in subsequent sections.

Why Did the FCAS Program Collapse?

Perun asserts that the FCAS program, formally known as the Strategic Combat Air System (SCAF), has been "on life support" for years. Despite extensive financial and political investment by France, Germany, and Spain, the project faced two fundamental challenges that ultimately led to its collapse: diverging national requirements and unresolvable industrial tensions.

Diverging National Requirements

From the outset, the participating nations struggled to align their visions for the next-generation fighter. Perun highlights that while all parties agreed on creating a stealth-capable aircraft designed for air combat, the specific roles and requirements were vastly different. France, for example, needed a multi-role fighter to succeed the Rafale, which would not only serve in air-to-air combat but also take on ground-attack missions, nuclear weapon delivery, and operate from aircraft carriers. These were fundamental elements of French military doctrine and strategic capabilities, particularly its commitment to an independent nuclear deterrent and its future aircraft carrier plans.

In contrast, Germany aimed for a continental air superiority fighter designed to defend airspace and engage in high-performance aerial combat, potentially in coordination with unmanned drone wingmen. Unlike France, Germany neither required a nuclear-capable aircraft nor had any plans to develop aircraft carriers. These stark differences in operational requirements created significant friction between the two nations.

France viewed a carrier-capable, nuclear-armed combat aircraft as indispensable to its defense and foreign policy goals, according to Perun. Hence, compromising on these critical features was not an option. Conversely, Germany viewed such requirements as unnecessary and even counterproductive for their air force. German leadership emphasized that the Luftwaffe needed a different kind of aircraft, explicitly stating that a nuclear-capable carrier jet was not relevant to Germany's military needs. This entrenched disagreement became a chronic bottleneck and left the project unable to arrive at a unified vision.

While some stakeholders eventually floated the concept of a "two-fighter solution," essentially building separate designs to meet both nations' unique needs, this approach failed to gain traction. Drawing parallels to the complexities seen in the development of the U.S. F-35's A/B/C variants, Perun argues that such initiatives tend to escalate costs and exacerbate coordination difficulties. In the end, despite these efforts to reconcile differing needs, the problem proved insurmountable. Perun highlights that the misalignment was not a recent discovery; it was well-known as early as 2019 that the aircraft would need to meet both carrier and nuclear requirements, alongside other capabilities. But even with this awareness, clarity on the overall mission and specifications remained elusive.

Industrial Tensions

The second major issue was industrial discord, which Perun likens to "a trench fight" common in multinational defense collaborations. While the governments involved strongly supported the project, much of the tension stemmed from conflicts among the industrial stakeholders. The crux of the issue was workshare: each country vied for a larger role in the project to secure job creation, gain access to advanced technologies, and accumulate valuable intellectual property. Perun explains that, despite agreements about fairness and capability, such negotiations frequently descend into what feels like a zero-sum contest.

A notable attempt to address this was the "best athlete concept," where the most qualified company would take responsibility for specific components of the program. However, simplifying workshare did not eliminate disputes over who should lead the fighter jet's development, a critical aspect of the program. Dassault, the French leader in aircraft design and the primary contractor for the manned fighter, demanded significant control over the project’s direction. The company argued that clear leadership was essential to ensure efficiency and leverage their unparalleled experience in fighter design.

Airbus, representing German and Spanish interests, rejected this notion. They argued that such a unilateral approach would undermine the multinational character of the program, particularly considering the financial and industrial contributions of Germany and Spain. Perun notes that neither side’s stance was inherently unreasonable, but the disagreements delayed decision-making and eroded trust among partners.

Historical Lessons of Failed Defense Collaborations

Perun draws attention to historical precedents where multinational defense projects disintegrated due to similar reasons. For example, France and Britain once collaborated on the Anglo-French variable geometry aircraft before diverging because of irreconcilable requirements. France eventually pursued the Rafale, while Britain joined other nations to develop the Eurofighter Typhoon. Another Cold War example is the MBT-70 tank project, a joint effort by the United States and West Germany, which collapsed under its own weight and resulted in the development of separate tanks: the Abrams and Leopard 2.

These historical patterns, Perun notes, should have served as cautionary tales for the FCAS program. Yet, as the years passed, tensions grew rather than diminished. Shortly before the program's collapse, executives from Dassault and Airbus openly questioned each other’s indispensability to the project. Dassault’s CEO went so far as to assert that the company could proceed independently, while Airbus suggested leaving out Dassault might simplify development.

Fallout of the FCAS's Collapse

The formal collapse of the FCAS fighter jet component represents a substantial loss for European defense. Perun emphasizes that the consequences extend far beyond financial sunk costs or technological delays. The failure reflects broader issues in Europe’s fragmented approach to strategic autonomy and collaboration.

The cancellation of the manned fighter development introduces uncertainty into Europe’s defense agenda at a critical time of rearmament spurred by increasingly tense global geopolitics. With this setback, European forces might wait longer to field a sixth-generation fighter, potentially falling further behind global powers like the United States and China, both of which continue to advance their own programs.

Moreover, the symbolic loss is not negligible. SCAF was a rare example of a fully multinational defense initiative intended to strengthen European unity and technological independence from allies like the United States. Its failure underscores the persistent challenges of truly collaborative defense development in Europe. Perun underscores that replacing the FCAS project with a new initiative is not merely a technical challenge; it's a political one, requiring a reinvention of how European nations collaborate on military aerospace technologies.

Looking forward, Perun suggests three intriguing questions remain: What will each participating nation do next? How will Europe adjust its strategic approach to military aviation development? And finally, can future multinational programs avoid falling into the same traps?

Post-FCAS: What’s Next for France, Germany, and Spain?

Perun begins by explaining that France is resolute in its intention to move forward with its own sixth-generation fighter project. The French government has a significant reliance on its defense sector for both economic activity and international influence. The Rafale, their current fourth-generation aircraft, remains viable for certain export markets, but as more fifth- and sixth-generation fighters become available globally, France cannot afford to rely solely on upgrading its legacy platform. While the Rafale’s performance has attracted buyers, its inherent design limitations as a fourth-generation jet prevent it from competing indefinitely with newer models like the F-35 or emerging sixth-generation aircraft. Retooling a Rafale into a stealth aircraft is simply not feasible.

This urgency is further fueled by the recognition that a next-generation fighter will play an essential role in safeguarding France’s sovereignty and defense capabilities. However, Perun highlights two significant challenges that Paris must confront. First, even if France develops the fighter primarily on its own, the country might still need to rely on multinational collaboration for critical systems, such as drone swarms or advanced networking systems. This would require substantial negotiation to ensure access while maintaining desired levels of autonomy, particularly in light of prior difficulties with multinational arrangements.

Second, Perun notes that France faces an uphill battle with financing such an ambitious endeavor. The FCAS program shared costs among multiple partners, but with Germany and Spain out of the picture, Paris must fill the financial gap alone or seek new partners. Potential international collaborators, like India and the UAE, have already proven unwilling to co-fund programs without significant technological transfers or industrial participation, terms France has been reluctant to meet. Moreover, French public finances are strained, burdened by high levels of debt and a growing deficit. While France is committed to increased defense spending to meet NATO targets, Perun explains that allocating billions for a standalone sixth-generation program would require tough compromises, either in the form of cuts to other defense programs or even a reduction in the new fighter’s capabilities.

Understanding these challenges, France could seek to offset costs through export markets. However, this would effectively be a gamble. Paris would need to front significant development funds in the hopes that foreign buyers invest once the aircraft is delivered. Perun likens this gamble to the initial years of uncertainty with the Rafale before it gained traction as an export product.

Germany’s Post-FCAS Trajectory

Germany, Perun outlines, has different priorities and challenges compared to France. Though less dependent on fighter exports, Germany’s defense policy emphasizes reducing reliance on the United States. Despite this, Perun sees three main directions Germany could take post-FCAS.

• Option 1: Abandoning a Sixth-Generation Fighter
  Perun suggests that Germany could decide not to pursue a sixth-generation manned fighter at all. This would involve relying on a mix of upgraded fourth-generation Eurofighters and additional F-35s. While the F-35 comes closer to fulfilling sixth-generation capabilities than existing Eurofighters or Rafales, this strategy might conflict with Germany’s commitment to reducing dependency on American-made weapons systems. Still, it offers cost advantages, as it avoids the risks and financial burden of a long-term, high-cost development program.

• Option 2: Create a German-Led European Program with New Partners
  Perun explains that German industry has already laid the groundwork for this alternative. Led by Airbus Defense and Space, the "Team Gen 6" initiative includes eight German defense contractors and seeks to revive a predominantly European sixth-generation fighter concept under Berlin’s leadership. Possible partners could include Sweden and Spain, which share common interests in strengthening their aerospace sectors. Perun notes that this option provides Germany with the ability to shape the specifications of the aircraft while supporting domestic industry. However, it also brings the usual challenges of delays, capability uncertainty, and the potential for political and technological disagreements that plagued FCAS.

• Option 3: Join the UK-Led Tempest Program
  Germany has floated the idea of joining an existing sixth-generation program, and Perun contends that Tempest, a UK-Italy-Japan collaborative program, is the most viable candidate. With shared requirements for a heavy air superiority fighter to replace the Eurofighter, Tempest’s goals align more closely with German defense priorities than FCAS did. The program’s advanced stage and commitment to operational readiness by 2035 make it an attractive option for the German military.

Perun explains that Germany might be able to improve its leverage through economic agreements, such as trade-offs involving other high-demand defense products like armored vehicles or munitions. Despite the potential for Germany's late entry to upend established work-share arrangements, key Tempest stakeholders have expressed tentative openness to Germany’s participation, albeit with caution about revisiting industrial agreements already in place.

Spain's Limited Prospects Without Partners

Turning to Spain, Perun points out the country's far more limited options for independent development. Unlike France or Germany, Spain lacks the financial and industrial capacity to independently develop or lead a cutting-edge sixth-generation program at scale. Historically, Spain has participated in multinational programs like the Eurofighter and FCAS to benefit from technology transfers and industrial workshare opportunities. However, with FCAS falling apart, its path forward will likely depend on alignment with either French or German initiatives, or potentially a seat at the table in a program like Tempest.

Perun notes here that Spain’s decision will almost certainly turn on its alignment with Germany, as it has historically been a close partner in European defense initiatives. If Berlin were to pursue either an independent program or join a project like Tempest, Spain would need to carefully weigh the industrial and technological returns against its own resource constraints.

Overall, Perun concludes that the FCAS breakup represents a critical juncture in the trajectory of military aviation for France, Germany, and Spain. Each nation faces distinct strategic challenges and trade-offs, and their decisions in the coming years will have ramifications far beyond their borders. While France might forge ahead with a national program, Germany and Spain seem more likely to gravitate toward new collaborative partnerships. The ultimate question remains whether Europe can unify its fragmented efforts or if competing national priorities will entrench divisions further.

Global Context: Competing Sixth-Generation Fighter Programs

According to Perun, the breakdown of the FCAS initiative and the uncertainty surrounding Tempest reflect a broader global reality: despite ambitious plans from many nations, the path to sixth-generation fighters is fraught with difficulties. In particular, Britain’s Tempest program faces internal financial challenges that could jeopardize its progress. Political debates over the United Kingdom's Defense Investment Plan, including rumored proposals to delay Tempest's funding, signal significant risks. Even minor delays, Perun notes, could harm partnerships with Japan, the program’s key international collaborator, strain industry supply chains, and erode the talent pool essential for manufacturing next-generation aircraft.

Perun stresses that sustaining an aircraft manufacturing ecosystem requires continuous design and production. This is not an endeavor that can be paused and easily resumed without significant losses. He points to the example of the United States, which faced considerable challenges revitalizing its shipbuilding and submarine industrial base following post-Cold War cuts. A similar lapse in investment for the Tempest could result in higher long-term costs, missed export opportunities, strained alliances, and diminished industrial capabilities. Delaying funding might be politically convenient but could deliver the adverse effects of both project abandonment and cost escalation with none of the benefits.

Globally, other nations are also running into challenges. Perun asserts that Russia is lagging behind badly; its focus remains on producing and scaling existing designs like the Su-57, and new developments appear stagnant. Meanwhile, China's sixth-generation ambitions are progressing steadily, albeit under a veil of secrecy. Perun regards China as a formidable competitor with its significant financial resources, industrial capacity, and track record of producing advanced fifth-generation fighters. A sixth-generation fleet for the People’s Liberation Army seems inevitable.

The United States remains firmly committed to next-generation air superiority, with the DARPA-led "FA-XX" envisioned as a successor to the F-22. Perun emphasizes that while some obstacles, such as budget allocations and development timelines, remain, the likelihood of the U.S. Air Force abandoning this critical component of its future arsenal is exceedingly slim. The timeline and specific features of this advanced fighter may be subject to change, but its eventual production is considered almost guaranteed.

Within Europe, however, the situation is more fluid. The collapse of the FCAS fighter component may provide an opening for the United Kingdom's Tempest program to bring in new partners and resources, particularly from key European players searching for alternatives. Yet even so, Tempest must overcome its own financial and political challenges to capitalize on these opportunities.

Perun concludes that while the demise of the FCAS program marks a significant setback, it could spur individual nations like France to double down on their own efforts or seek alternative multinational collaborations. Similarly, Germany and Spain are left reevaluating their options, with Germany potentially aligning with the Tempest program and Spain facing tough decisions about whether to join another joint effort or drastically revise its own strategic aims. At the crux of this discussion is the broader question of European defense and industrial autonomy, a priority that remains as critical now as it was when the FCAS project was first launched. However, whether Europe can coalesce around a unified path forward or will continue to fragment remains an open and pressing question.

What was said, and when

The points this article makes, and the moment in the recording where each was said. Every time below opens the recording at that moment.

• Fighter generations' terminology isn't universal and is often exploited for marketing purposes. 02:18.
• Countries and companies label fourth-generation aircraft with "fourth-generation plus" or similar terms to indicate integration of modern features. 02:18.
• According to Perun, a sixth-generation fighter must feature advanced stealth capabilities for survivability in highly contested environments. 03:00.
• According to Perun, sixth-generation fighters are expected to represent a significant technological leap in sensors, computing power, electrical output, and cooling systems. 03:00.
• Perun emphasizes the integration of air combat drones as collaborative platforms in air missions for sixth-generation fighters. 03:33.
• Sixth-generation fighters are expected to function as part of a broader "system of systems," acting as high-tech command centers in the skies. 03:33.
• Developing a sixth-generation fighter demands designing the aircraft alongside its associated components, such as drones and advanced networking architectures. 04:21.
• Prior to sixth-generation fighters, debates existed around the necessity of crewed fighters amidst advancing drone capabilities. 20:01.
• Major military powers concluded that crewed fighter development remains necessary despite the expanding capabilities of drones. 05:08.
• French, German, and Spanish funding and collaboration underpinned the FCAS program. 11:07.
• France and Germany initially joined forces on FCAS in 2017, with Spain joining in 2019. 00:30.
• The FCAS program aimed to develop a state-of-the-art sixth-generation combat system, including a next-generation fighter and advanced technologies like a unified combat cloud and system of drones. 12:07.
• The European FCAS approach emphasized lightweight "remote carriers," missile-sized drones launched by aircraft, contrasting with reusable combat drone approaches from countries like the U.S. 13:21.
• Airbus unveiled a larger, reusable drone by 2022 within the FCAS program. 13:30.
• The FCAS program's manned fighter was intended to replace the Dassault Rafale for France and the Eurofighter Typhoon for Germany. 13:56.
• According to Perun, industrial arrangements, political sensitivities around workshare, and national priorities challenged the FCAS program from the start. 19:37.
• Diverging national requirements contributed to FCAS's collapse, with France requiring a nuclear-capable, carrier-based multi-role fighter and Germany emphasizing a continental air superiority fighter. 15:23.
• Germany excluded nuclear and carrier requirements for the FCAS fighter, aligning with its own defense priorities. 17:48.
• The challenge of aligning requirements was known as early as 2019. 19:16.
• Industrial discord over workshare impeded the FCAS program's progress. 20:22.
• France demanded Dassault significant control over the fighter's development within FCAS due to its experience. 22:19.
• Airbus objected to Dassault's demand for control, emphasizing the need for a multinational project approach. 22:19.
• Perun identifies historical precedents like the MBT-70 tank project and the Anglo-French variable geometry aircraft as examples of failed multinational defense collaborations. 23:54.
• FCAS's failure represents a setback for European defense unity and industrial independence. 28:51.
• France is resolute in progressing on its own sixth-generation fighter project. 29:47.
• France heavily relies on its defense sector for economic and international influence. 29:47.
• The Rafale's limitations as a fourth-generation fighter will challenge France against emerging fifth- and sixth-generation fighters. 31:07.
• Retrofitting the Rafale for stealth is not viable according to Perun. 31:07.
• France faces challenges of financing and returning to collaborations while maintaining autonomy for its sixth-generation fighter project. 32:46.
• Germany might abandon a sixth-generation fighter program, rely on upgraded Eurofighters, and purchase additional F-35s, says Perun, highlighting financial and dependency considerations as factors against independent development efforts post-FCAS. 37:20.