Understanding the USS Washington Deployment and Carrier Rotation Strategy

Strategic Reasoning Behind the USS Washington Deployment

Retired naval aviator Ward Carroll began by revisiting recent events involving the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) and its extended deployment in the North Arabian Sea. The aircraft carrier, which departed from Naval Air Station North Island near San Diego just before Thanksgiving of the previous year, was initially headed for the 7th Fleet's area of operations in the Western Pacific. However, it was rerouted to the 5th Fleet's area of responsibility in the Middle East in response to escalating regional tensions. The Lincoln arrived in the North Arabian Sea by early January and encountered significant challenges from the start.

Carroll described one of the first major incidents involving the Lincoln. Shortly after its arrival in the region, the carrier faced a swarm of hostile drones. An F-35C fighter from the ship managed to shoot down one of the drones, marking the first such engagement by a carrier-based F-35C. This incident occurred just before the launch of the military operation known as Epic Fury, which began on February 28. Barely two months into its deployment in the North Arabian Sea, the Lincoln was already operating in a high-stakes environment.

The challenges for the Lincoln escalated after an Iranian attack struck the 5th Fleet's headquarters in Manama, Bahrain. According to Carroll, this attack eliminated a vital logistical hub that had been central to the resupply operations for the Lincoln and its accompanying strike group, leaving the Navy scrambling to establish alternative supply chains. The supply chain, unexpectedly rerouted to Djibouti in East Africa, significantly increased operational challenges. Carroll painted a vivid picture of sailors facing issues like "poor supply chain" maintenance, including an instance where a meal served aboard the ship appeared so unappetizing that some questioned whether it was human food at all. Additionally, issues such as mildew in showers and declining habitability emerged, creating a narrative in the media that framed the Lincoln as a struggling vessel, dubbed by some as a "ghost ship."

The rising concerns around the Lincoln’s extended presence and logistical difficulties led to high-profile interventions. Carroll recounted the sequence of events, including a town hall organized in early August at North Island. The acting Secretary of the Navy and other top naval officials met with sailors and their families to address concerns over the carrier's future. Carroll noted that at the time, officials admitted they had no definite timeline for when the Lincoln would be relieved.

The situation was compounded by the involvement of another aircraft carrier, the USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77), which joined the North Arabian Sea region on a shorter-duration mission. According to Carroll, this sparked questions as to why the Bush had not faced similar logistical issues. Carroll attributed this to the timing of the Bush’s deployment, coming off a more recent resupply of food and equipment when it arrived in the area. However, the strain of maintaining high operational tempo and ensuring proper logistics across such an extended deployment became overwhelmingly evident in the Lincoln's case.

With reports of deteriorating conditions on the Lincoln receiving widespread media and political attention, Naval leadership decided to dispatch a third carrier to the region to relieve the crew of the Lincoln. It was soon confirmed that the USS George Washington (CVN-73) would take up that role. Carroll highlighted two critical factors motivating the decision: the Pentagon’s 2.0 Carrier Strike Group (CSG) presence mandate for the North Arabian Sea, which remains necessary due to the ongoing blockade and the tense post-Epic Fury environment, and the increasingly difficult logistical challenges faced during extended deployments.

Carroll provided a historical perspective to contextualize the urgency of the George Washington’s relief mission. He recalled his own experience during a three-carrier operation in the Persian Gulf during Operation Southern Watch, aimed at enforcing the no-fly zone over southern Iraq. At that time, the USS George Washington, USS Nimitz, and USS Independence operated in close quarters, necessitating coordinated turnover and logistical operations. The face-to-face turnover planned for the Lincoln and George Washington is a similarly intricate process. According to Carroll, it involves the two carriers sailing side by side while helicopters shuttle critical equipment and classified materials between the two vessels.

One significant factor in this rotation is the advanced capabilities of the F-35C, the carrier-launched variant of the F-35 fighter jet. Both the Lincoln and the George Washington had been modified to operate these jets effectively. Carroll emphasized how upgrades to systems like jet blast deflectors to handle the heat from the F-35C’s engine, and specialized hangar bays for supporting the aircraft’s unique maintenance and storage requirements, were costly but essential infrastructure investments for modern carrier operations. Carroll pointed out that many carriers, even newly built Ford-class ones like the USS Gerald R. Ford, had not yet been modified for the F-35C. Consequently, the George Washington’s ability to seamlessly replace the Lincoln in the combat zone without losing operational capability is a reflection of its preparedness for modern warfare. He stressed that reliance on modified carriers highlights the potential vulnerability of a fleet struggling to keep pace with changing demands and advancements in aviation technology.

As the discussion progressed, Sal Mercogliano, a professor and maritime historian, joined the conversation. He outlined the recent escalation around the Strait of Hormuz, a key maritime chokepoint critical for global oil shipping. Recently, Iranian forces have targeted and even seized ships transiting the Strait, significantly disrupting global shipping. Mercogliano noted that U.S. Central Command has responded by ramping up blockades and aerial escorts, using helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, and drones to safeguard shipping in the area. He observed that this environment is "very combative" and that regional escalation, particularly between the U.S. and Iran, further complicates the already delicate balance of the region.

Mercogliano also highlighted an astonishing jump in shipping costs caused by the conflict. Desperate attempts to circumvent the risks around the Strait of Hormuz and related chokepoints, such as the Bab el-Mandeb at the southern end of the Red Sea and the Panama Canal, have created additional economic instability in global oil supply chains. He noted the costs of chartering oil tankers and vessel queues at critical global bottlenecks had skyrocketed, creating operational headaches for shipping companies and with broader implications for global energy markets.

These factors collectively underscore the strategic importance of maintaining and rotating a robust U.S. carrier strike group presence in the region. However, Mercogliano and Carroll both pointed out that such operations expose critical vulnerabilities in the current state of U.S. naval logistics. They argue that while U.S. Carriers like the Lincoln and George Washington represent a powerful projection of American military might. The logistical systems that support them, ranging from supply ships to forward bases, were designed for peacetime operations and may be inadequate for sustained wartime demands.

The discussion concluded with Mercogliano’s observation that today’s logistics challenges are rooted in decisions made decades ago to reduce dedicated naval logistics support in favor of civilian-manned fleets. He explained that this shift worked in prior conflicts where the U.S. had secure, forward-operating bases like Subic Bay during the Vietnam War or Bahrain for operations in the Persian Gulf. However, as Mercogliano noted, supply chains reliant on Diego Garcia and other more distant ports result in a “massively elongated supply chain.” These challenges have stark implications under the intensified operating conditions that carriers in the region face today and will likely require a strategic reassessment of logistical operations by the U.S. Navy.

Operational Challenges Faced During Long Deployments

Sal Mercogliano highlights a key issue facing the U.S. Navy during prolonged deployments: the reliance on a peacetime logistics system to support wartime operations. He explains that while combat forces, the "tip of the spear," receive significant attention, the equally crucial logistical elements often go underappreciated until issues arise. For example, when routine supply chains are disrupted, carrier crews may notice discrepancies in their daily provisions, such as a lack of fresh milk or vegetables. Though Mercogliano does not suggest that personnel aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln are missing meals, he notes that their replenishments are likely not as robust as they would be under peacetime conditions.

The loss of key logistical hubs like Manama has severely strained operations, according to both Mercogliano and Ward Carroll. The transition to relying on resupply efforts from more distant bases, such as Diego Garcia, has introduced significant logistical complications due to its location outside normal commercial shipping lanes. Mercogliano recounts that during times of operational stress, ammunition and other supplies had to be shipped from Diego Garcia, often using specialized vessels like AKE ships and refrigerated container ships (often called "reefers"). This intricate logistical system demands meticulous planning and coordination, particularly as it compensates for the absence of more nearby, operational hubs.

Both Carroll and Mercogliano agree that the logistical challenges for the Navy become further magnified under combined wartime conditions. Carroll underscores that part of the issue lies in historical decisions to shift from Navy-manned logistics ships to civilian-operated fleets, which were suitable during previous conflicts when the U.S. had secure bases in locations like Japan, Subic Bay, or Bahrain. However, in a region as vast as the North Arabian Sea, where the Navy is now tasked with a massive maritime interdiction operation, the systemic cracks become evident. He recalls his time on the USS America and the USS Detroit, emphasizing the value of Navy-operated support ships and how relinquishing them has contributed to the Navy's current logistical fragility.

As an example, Carroll discusses a scenario during his career where he was involved in a replenishment exercise between America and Detroit in rough Atlantic waters. This demonstration of U.S. logistical self-sufficiency at sea contrasts sharply with today's reliance on civilian-managed fleet tenders, which came about as a result of cost-saving measures taken long ago. According to him, this shift has resulted in a supply system that struggles to handle significant disruptions.

Straining the System

Carroll remarks that the shortage and strain on logistical operations represent a deeper issue. The U.S. Navy has only 11 carrier strike groups, and even fewer are currently available for deployment given the demands in both the CENTCOM and INDOPACOM regions. For instance, in April and May, a particularly difficult stretch for the Lincoln, Admiral Verissimo admitted that the confluence of losing Manama as a supply hub and trying to coordinate logistics from Diego Garcia and Djibouti created a “peacetime logistics construct against wartime operational requirements.”

Carroll expresses frustration over what he sees as a misrepresentation of the issue in the media. Reports suggesting a "fleet-wide" logistical crisis have, in his view, exaggerated isolated problems. He acknowledges that Lincoln’s situation was challenging but says the Navy’s extensive planning and expertise ensured operational effectiveness. After a tough period spanning several weeks in the late spring, logistical challenges were addressed. However, Carroll notes that the "bow wave" created during the spring disruptions extended into the summer, sustaining the strain on the fleet. The situation was exacerbated, in part, by the administration’s belated and indifferent public response to what Carroll sees as systemic logistical oversight.

The strain does not solely impact carriers. Mercogliano emphasizes the immense distances involved in maintaining the current blockade in the North Arabian Sea. This operation is demanding on all types of vessels. The USS Abraham Lincoln and USS George H. W. Bush, along with destroyers operating in blockade lines near Oman and Muscat, are covering a vast operational area that stretches from Diego Garcia to Mumbai, spanning over 2,200 miles. He explains that blockades are resource-intensive, involving round-the-clock maritime interdiction operations that require air and sea patrols to monitor for ships operating with their transponders off. Shorter-range aircraft like the F/A-18 Hornet exacerbate logistical difficulties, as aerial refueling is essential for extended operations in such a large area.

Ward Carroll expands on these points, pointing out that maintaining 24/7 combat operations with only two carrier strike groups is an unsustainable strain on the fleet. Past campaigns in the Middle East required the rotation of carriers out of the operational theatre, with at least one carrier always resting. Today’s deployments in the region, including the ongoing shadow of the "Epic Fury" operations and subsequent blockades, make it challenging to return the fleet to a more sustainable posture.

Carroll notes that the CMV-22 Ospreys tasked with resupplying the strike groups lack self-defense capabilities, making their operations particularly hazardous in contested environments. Moreover, the Navy’s reliance on Diego Garcia for resupply, a base ill-equipped for rapid responses, requires hiring commercial tankers to support oilers and ammunition ships. Without additional warehouses or a robust alternative, this reliance on a single, remote hub will continue to undermine operational flexibility.

According to Mercogliano, this situation has left commanders at higher echelons sounding alarms about the dangers of overextension. He cites individuals like General Kane and Admiral Cooper, who have raised concerns about whether it is feasible to maintain such high levels of naval activity in the long term. Carroll agrees, stating that the Navy’s capabilities are designed for strategic deployments that achieve long-term objectives, but the assumption that its operational intensity can sustain indefinitely is flawed.

Mercogliano also discusses the corresponding impact on destroyer escorts, particularly the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, which have become critical to the ongoing blockade. These destroyers are often required to operate at high speeds, which significantly increases their need for fuel and shortens the intervals between maintenance. These tasks place enormous pressure on human and logistical resources alike, further complicating the broader task of maintaining fleet readiness. By his estimate, operational wear on both carriers and escorts will only continue to mount unless the Navy either scales back its commitments or bolsters its logistical infrastructure.

To navigate the challenges, Mercogliano suggests expanding Diego Garcia’s capacity further, although he acknowledges the immense costs and time this would entail. Carroll underscores the broader issue of a systemic mismatch between the Navy’s operational tempo and its logistics infrastructure, calling for senior leaders to define clear priorities. The inability to address these matters fully impacts the very foundation of U.S. naval readiness.

Implications for the Carrier Fleet Strategy

Ward Carroll, a retired naval aviator and host of the discussion, begins by revisiting remarks made by Admiral Samuel Paparo during his confirmation testimony two years ago. At the time, Senator Roger Wicker asked Admiral Paparo about dealing with a multi-front global defense landscape and whether such commitments would affect the U.S. Navy’s ability to maintain coverage in critical areas of operation. Carroll notes that Paparo expressed concerns about the feasibility of sustaining the required levels of carrier operations, specifically pointing out potential issues with precision-guided munitions inventories. These concerns, voiced two years ago, resonate even more strongly in light of current global demands, Carroll observes.

Paparo acknowledged that significant challenges, including the ongoing war in Ukraine and regional tensions in the Middle East, were straining the Navy’s ability to maintain necessary levels of global readiness. He highlighted the department's need to rapidly move assets between theaters, emphasizing that this "asset sharing" is now necessary due to the pressures on existing resources. Carroll underscores how this issue is not new but remains persistent, especially as the Navy has struggled to maintain a minimum two-carrier presence in theaters like the Mediterranean and the North Arabian Sea. What was once “an obnoxious amount” of carrier presence during peacetime is now, according to Carroll, an elusive luxury.

Carroll notes that even when theater commanders were forced to operate without carrier strike groups, they devised workarounds using other naval assets, such as amphibious ships and readily available but unscheduled forces. However, Paparo’s testimony had also highlighted the stark logistics challenges associated with this approach. For instance, the time it would take for a carrier to reposition from one area of operations to another, roughly 10 days under the best-case scenario, represents a significant vulnerability should immediate action be required in a high-end conflict.

Paparo’s concerns about depleted munitions inventories were particularly noteworthy. Weapons such as Standard Missiles and Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs), crucial in conflicts ranging from maritime operations to airstrikes, were already being strained by U.S. involvement in the Middle East and Ukraine. Carroll stresses that this inventory issue has only exacerbated over time, with vital stores of air-to-air missiles (like the AIM classes) and naval missiles (such as the SM series) being continually siphoned to support operational theaters outside the Indo-Pacific. These shortages, as Paparo framed it, are an ongoing drag on U.S. readiness in areas like the South China Sea, which remains under pressure from China’s territorial ambitions.

Carroll emphasizes how carriers, as mobile airfields, provide an indispensable advantage compared to fixed bases, which are vulnerable to attack. Carriers can relocate swiftly in response to crises, delivering immediate military presence and operational capability. He recalls historical examples of this adaptability, such as using the USS Kitty Hawk to deploy troops in Afghanistan and the USS Eisenhower during a humanitarian crisis in Haiti. Echoing Paparo, Carroll points out that carriers enable quick redeployments, such as moving from San Diego training exercises to being battle-ready in a high-tension zone, as the USS George Washington recently demonstrated. The flexibility to replenish carriers at sea further enhances their operational endurance, a critical attribute in today's logistical environment.

Sal Mercogliano, a renowned maritime historian and logistics expert, expands on Carroll’s points by underlining the systemic strain on the U.S. Navy's fleet and logistical network. He explains that the current operational pace is unsustainable and compares the Navy’s situation to “trying to run a 500-600 ship fleet with fewer than 300 ships.” This capacity gap, Mercogliano argues, affects not only America's 11 aircraft carriers (with shrinking numbers) but also the accompanying vessels such as destroyers, cruisers, and logistical support ships. The “Baker’s dozen” of deployed destroyers, according to him, will require extended downtime once they return, adding to the fleet’s overall wear and tear.

Mercogliano also raises concerns about shipbuilding and maintenance timelines, highlighting the cascading effects of continuous demand. The Navy is already facing delays with the construction of newer carriers. Referring to Kennedy, he notes its recent sea trials as a significant milestone but points out that issues with its follow-on carriers place the Navy at risk of failing to sustain its 11-carrier fleet in years to come. If no mitigation occurs, the fleet could drop to fewer than ten carriers, a "gap you can't overcome quickly," as Mercogliano warns.

Both Carroll and Mercogliano agree that adaptability in naval logistics is equally critical as ship design and weaponry. Mercogliano contrasts the Navy’s current logistics setup with its historical approach. He recalls the robust operational capabilities of the Military Sealift Command (MSC) during Operation Desert Storm in the 1990s, when MSC operated as a three-star command directly reporting to the Chief of Naval Operations. Today, however, it functions at a diminished capacity with reduced strategic oversight. According to Mercogliano, putting logistics back at the forefront and increasing the resources allocated to logistics vessels would be key to addressing the challenges of sustaining maritime operations over extended deployments.

A historical anecdote illustrates the potential perils of downscaled logistics operations. Mercogliano recalls the case of the replenishment oiler Big Horn, which ran aground two years ago while supporting USS Abraham Lincoln’s battle group. He explains that the incident disrupted operations, delivering a harsh lesson about the Navy’s reduced capacity for sustaining long-term deployments. Issues such as fuel shortages, depleted ordnance supplies, and mechanical breakdowns highlight how critical logistics are to operational readiness.

Ultimately, both Carroll and Mercogliano stress that the current operational demands exceed what the U.S. Navy's force structure and logistics infrastructure can sustainably support. They argue for increasing the Navy’s operational capacity through expanded shipbuilding efforts and improved logistical frameworks. However, they caution that these changes will take time and significant investment to implement, leaving the fleet and its supply chains vulnerable to continued strain in the short term.

What was said, and when

The points this article makes, and the moment in the recording where each was said. Every time below opens the recording at that moment.

• Ward Carroll stated that the USS Abraham Lincoln was rerouted to the 5th Fleet's area of responsibility in the Middle East in response to escalating regional tensions. 00:36.
• Ward Carroll noted that the USS Abraham Lincoln arrived in the North Arabian Sea by early January. 00:36.
• Ward Carroll highlighted that an F-35C from the USS Abraham Lincoln shot down a hostile drone during its deployment. 01:25.
• Ward Carroll pointed out that this drone engagement marked the first such event by a carrier-based F-35C. 01:25.
• According to Ward Carroll, a military operation named Epic Fury began on February 28 and impacted the USS Abraham Lincoln. 01:25.
• Ward Carroll mentioned that an Iranian attack struck the 5th Fleet's headquarters in Manama, Bahrain, disrupting logistical operations. 02:04.
• Ward Carroll described the relocation of the Navy's supply chain to Djibouti in East Africa due to the attack on the 5th Fleet's headquarters. 02:04.
• Ward Carroll observed that deteriorating conditions aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln, such as mildew and poor meals, were reported in the media. 04:22.
• Sal Mercogliano stated that Iranian forces have targeted and seized ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz recently. 16:59.
• Sal Mercogliano pointed out that U.S. Central Command has ramped up blockades and aerial escorts in the Strait of Hormuz to safeguard shipping. 16:30.
• Sal Mercogliano described a recent spike in shipping costs due to regional conflict and risks at key maritime chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz. 17:20.
• Ward Carroll noted that the USS George Washington was deployed to relieve the USS Abraham Lincoln in the North Arabian Sea as part of a planned rotation strategy. 00:09.
• Ward Carroll explained that modifications for the F-35C, like updated jet blast deflectors and specialized hangar bays, were made on both the USS Abraham Lincoln and the USS George Washington. 13:31.
• Ward Carroll provided historical context with operations like Southern Watch, where carriers executed coordinated turnovers and logistical efforts. 11:31.
• Ward Carroll and Sal Mercogliano described logistical reliance on civilian-operated fleets and the shift away from dedicated naval logistics ships. 1:18:53.
• Ward Carroll stated that logistical strain includes the USS Abraham Lincoln facing increased challenges due to reliance on distant bases like Diego Garcia. 49:22.
• Sal Mercogliano emphasized that logistical shortcomings are deeply rooted in systemic decisions made decades ago. 28:00.
• Sal Mercogliano noted that the North Arabian Sea operation spans vast areas, demanding intensive maritime and aerial patrol efforts. 1:07:09.
• Ward Carroll stated that CMV-22 Ospreys lack self-defense capabilities, making them vulnerable in contested environments. 47:53.
• Both Carroll and Mercogliano highlighted naval logistics being insufficiently robust for sustained operations in contested regions. 49:48.
• Ward Carroll mentioned Admiral Paparo's concerns about sustaining carrier operations under multi-front global commitments. 1:03:12.
• Ward Carroll pointed out concerns about depleted munitions inventories, particularly affecting precision-guided munitions. 58:23.
• Ward Carroll emphasized that carriers provide adaptability and operational endurance compared to fixed bases. 1:13:07.
• Sal Mercogliano compared the Navy's current strained fleet operational setup to maintaining a 600-ship force with fewer than 300 ships. 1:06:46.
• Sal Mercogliano described ongoing delays in carrier construction, emphasizing the fleet's risk of dropping below 11 carriers. 1:07:23.
• Sal Mercogliano referred to MSC’s diminished operational capacity compared to its role during Operation Desert Storm. 1:18:19.
• Sal Mercogliano mentioned incidents like the replenishment oiler Big Horn running aground as examples of logistical vulnerabilities. 1:19:26.
• Both Carroll and Mercogliano argued that significant investment in shipbuilding and logistics infrastructure is required for sustainable operations. 1:07:56.