Shillelagh Missile: A Historical Overview

Understanding the Shillelagh Missile

Veteran armor officer Nicholas Moran begins by dissecting the MGM-51 Shillelagh missile, which was a gun-launched missile designed primarily for light tanks in mid-20th-century armored warfare. Moran explains that the Shillelagh’s development was part of a broader push during the Cold War to extend the range and lethality of light tanks, making them capable of engaging armored targets at greater distances. The concept was ambitious at the time, as engineers sought to integrate guided munitions into tank weaponry at an era when these technologies were still in their infancy.

However, Moran is critical of the Shillelagh system, noting multiple shortcomings. He points out its limited practicality, citing challenges with guidance systems, reliability issues, and performance limitations that plagued the missile. According to Moran, one of the key issues was the requirement for a large launcher tube that could not efficiently fire conventional rounds. This design choice severely restricted the tank's utility and complicated operations on the battlefield.

Moran goes on to argue that the Shillelagh serves as a case study in poorly conceived military innovations that fail to account for real-world conditions and tactical utility. He emphasizes that the era in which the Shillelagh was introduced, marked by a strong belief in guided munitions, was pivotal in shaping modern armored warfare. Despite its failures, the Shillelagh highlighted the importance of integrating advanced weaponry into armored platforms, even if it lacked the effectiveness to set the standard.

Moran also contextualizes the Shillelagh in the broader timeline of armored warfare. He explains that its development reflected a transitional phase in military technology, one that recognized the need for tanks to have additional roles beyond traditional close combat. Though the missile itself was not a success, it set the stage for subsequent advancements, pushing engineers and designers to refine gun-launched guided missile systems for future tank generations.

The Schakal Variant and Medium Forces Evolution

Shifting gears, Moran tackles a question from a listener regarding the Schakal variant of the Boxer armored vehicle and its potential role in Germany’s evolving medium force doctrine. The Schakal combines the German Army's Boxer wheeled armored personnel carrier (APC) chassis with the advanced Puma turret, creating a formidable vehicle that also accommodates up to six dismounted troops. According to Moran, the Schakal aims to strike a balance between firepower, troop transport capability, protection, and rapid deployability. However, Moran remains skeptical of the medium-weight brigade concept driving vehicles like the Schakal.

Moran begins by highlighting the logistical challenges of deploying heavy equipment by air. He notes that one of the key advantages of U.S. Stryker units is their relative ease of air transport, enabling faster global deployment. However, he criticizes the Boxer platform, saying, "It’s freaking huge. You are not going to get that into a C-130 or easily into an A400M." He clarifies that the Boxer’s size necessitates disassembling the chassis and mission module to fit in transport aircraft. This process is time-consuming and requires substantial resources. This limitation severely undermines the vehicle’s claim to being rapidly deployable.

Germany’s A400M fleet size is another constraint. Moran estimates that the country’s current capabilities would not even suffice to airlift a full battalion of Boxers at once. He contrasts this with U.S. Stryker brigade combat teams (IBCTs), which, while also challenging to move logistically, remain deployable with the entire U.S. Air Force's heavy-lift fleet. He highlights that the primary advantage of wheeled units like the Stryker and Boxer lies in their ability to maneuver quickly, particularly in a European theater. Moran contends that such rapid deployability is only practical if the deployed force is capable of holding a line until heavier units can arrive to support them. Without a sufficient and ready heavy force to follow up, the entire concept becomes questionable.

Moran does not dismiss the Schakal entirely. He discusses its merits, particularly its impressive modern features like underfloor blast protection and advanced fire control systems. However, he remains critical of its value-for-cost ratio, noting that its hefty size and limited troop capacity seem inefficient compared to other platforms, such as the Puma or even the Stryker. He questions, “Why do you really want a big-wheeled infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) with a 30 mm cannon on it, especially if you’re already in the general vicinity of the expected war?”

Moran also emphasizes practical concerns with Schakal’s design beyond its size. He recalls his hands-on experience with the vehicle at an exhibition: "It’s freaking huge... And man, I understand why, but the thing is so massive." He raises operational concerns about the vehicle’s high profile, which makes it more difficult for soldiers to safely disembark in combat situations. This is a key requirement for a vehicle designed to quickly deploy dismounts. He questions whether the Schakal is worth the investment when Puma IFVs, which use tracked platforms, are already readily available for use in similar roles within the Bundeswehr.

In concluding his evaluation of the Schakal, Moran underscores the importance of aligning vehicle design with doctrine and strategic needs. While the Schakal represents an advanced wheeled IFV with noteworthy features, its role within the German Bundeswehr’s medium forces doctrine raises questions about its practicality and cost-efficiency. For now, Moran argues, the Schakal’s size, logistical demands, and potential redundancy alongside existing platforms make its future in the German arsenal uncertain.

Moran's analysis of the Schakal serves as an example of how vehicle design cannot be separated from strategic and logistical considerations. His critique raises larger questions about the effectiveness and practicality of medium-weight brigades in modern European military doctrine.

Modern Armor and Its Evolving Role in Combined Arms Operations

Nicholas Moran explores how the balance between troop capacity, firepower, and vehicle survivability continues to shape the design of modern armored vehicles. He begins by referencing a user named Madhuin, who performed calculations on the cost, manpower, and operational implications of varying troop capacities in mechanized units. For example, adding just two more passengers to a vehicle might yield a 25% to 30% reduction in overall costs. This includes the reduced need for purchasing additional vehicles, spares, and the associated crew. However, he clarifies that the economics of such changes don't scale directly.

Moran raises a crucial question: how much troop-carrying capacity is appropriate before it becomes more efficient to reduce the number of vehicles and instead prioritize deploying dedicated firepower assets, such as the M10 Booker assault gun or modernized main battle tanks? He points out that reducing troop capacity in favor of enhanced firepower is part of a historical oscillation. Earlier mechanized units often had an overemphasis on armor at the expense of troop capacity. This was later rebalanced to meet the needs of infantry-heavy operations. Now, vehicle designs like the Boxer Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV), equipped with a 30 mm cannon and missiles, and the XM30, featuring a 50 mm autocannon, demonstrate how militaries are adding substantial firepower to troop carriers. Moran warns that if this trend persists, the future could see troop carriers morph into platforms resembling the heavily armed Merkava, a tank capable of carrying only two dismount troops while maintaining immense armor and firepower.

Despite the potential cost-effectiveness of fewer, larger vehicles with enhanced capacities, Moran identifies major risks. He notes that losing a single large transport vehicle, especially to mines or anti-vehicle missiles, would eliminate the combat effectiveness of an entire platoon. This reflects a trade-off: while large vehicles may consolidate resources, the operational risk associated with losing such high-capacity platforms can be catastrophic.

Moran also discusses the challenges of increasing troop capacity in contemporary vehicles like the Puma IFV and the Namer armored personnel carrier, both of which have grown heavier over time due to enhanced protective measures. The demand for better all-around armor now means these vehicles feature tank-like weight, which requires design modifications such as additional road wheels. Moran highlights the physical constraints these upgrades impose, such as increased weight and size, which can make deployment and operational flexibility more difficult.

In amphibious operations, troop capacity remains particularly significant. Moran notes how the U.S. Marine Corps transitioned from older Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAVs), which could transport about 20 troops, to the newer Amphibious Combat Vehicles (ACVs), which hold approximately 12. The limited space aboard amphibious ships for transporting such vehicles imposes significant constraints, reminding us that not all troops can simply swim to shore.

Pivoting to historical context, Moran responds to a question about whether increased use of T-34/85 and IS tanks during the Korean War might have altered UN strategies or equipment. He suggests that the impact would likely have been minimal. While it might have prompted the extended use of the M26 Pershing rather than the more outdated M4 Shermans, he notes that existing American and British armor, including the M46 Patton tanks and Centurions, was generally more than capable. They were especially effective when supplemented with advancements like High-Velocity Armor-Piercing (HVAP) ammunition. For Moran, the rapid pace and unplanned nature of the Korean War, a "come-as-you-are" conflict, limited the practicality of rushing new vehicles like a hypothetical larger fleet of heavier tanks into service in time to affect the outcome.

Moran then shifts gears to a niche but intriguing topic brought up by a viewer related to the T95 FV4201 Chieftain hybrid. He explains the historical background of the concept, which emerged from discussions between the U.S. and U.K. to exchange components of their respective tank designs, including swapping turrets between the Chieftain and the T95. However, the idea hit practical roadblocks. For example, fitting the Chieftain turret on the T95 hull proved exceedingly difficult. The T95 turret on the Chieftain hull was somewhat more feasible but required significant engineering work. Ultimately, these proposed combinations never went beyond prototype stages, as Canadian forces sought different goals with armament justifying new designs altogether.

The commentary also shifts to innovations in tank ammunition, specifically canister rounds. Moran notes their historical significance, particularly during the Pacific campaigns of World War II, where they were developed for the small-caliber guns of vehicles like the M3 Medium and Light tanks. Although the U.S. was a dominant proponent of canister rounds, other nations, including the British, adopted similar technology. He shares their use in Vietnam by Australian Centurions, citing Canister on Fire, a book by Bruce Cameron. Moran explains that while canister rounds, essentially anti-infantry munitions that disperse a spray of metal fragments, were effective in stripping cover and engaging exposed troops, the trend has generally moved towards high-explosive shells with programmable fuses. These offer greater versatility.

Turning to modern developments in armored vehicles, Moran discusses the status of the XM30 program, its prospects, and its implications for the Armor Branch. Designed initially as the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle, its goals have since been scaled back to create the more practical Minimally Manned Fighting Vehicle. According to Moran, this represents a broader pattern in U.S. Army procurement, which tends to start with ambitious programs that are progressively downscaled to meet feasibility and budgetary constraints. Similarly, the M1E3 Abrams, a next-generation upgrade from the current M1A2 SEP v3 Abrams, is intended to address issues such as excessive weight. This makes it more capable for future 2040s and 2050s combat scenarios.

Discussing global trends, Moran compares these developments to Germany’s Leopard 2A8 program, which he describes as an interim solution ahead of the multinational Main Ground Combat System (MGCS). He characterizes the XM30 and M1E3 as potential transformational advancements, arguing that only a few countries globally will likely be capable of deploying fully mechanized battalions with such technology over the next several decades.

Finally, Moran addresses the future of cavalry operations within modern combined arms doctrine. He notes the decline of traditional cavalry squadrons, driven both by personnel shortages and changes in tactical priorities, but adds that the remaining armored brigades and divisions continue to exhibit formidable capability. As the role of cavalry evolves, a new manual is set to redefine its purpose in enabling main-body operations through "informing, protecting, and fighting."

Closing on a lighter note, Moran turns to questions about tank-related oddities, discussing hybrid tank designs, vehicle water generation concepts, the quirky appeal of vintage boots, and niche ammunition solutions. He concludes with reflections on his career in squadron command and upcoming travel plans, suggesting an openness to the possibility of a retirement that may or may not be on the horizon.

What was said, and when

The points this article makes, and the moment in the recording where each was said. Everything below was said by Nicholas Moran. Every time opens the recording at that moment.

• Veteran armor officer Nicholas Moran describes the MGM-51 Shillelagh missile as a gun-launched missile designed primarily for light tanks in mid-20th-century armored warfare. 40:45.
• The Shillelagh missile's guidance systems faced reliability issues and performance limitations. 05:15.
• The Schakal variant of the Boxer armored vehicle combines the Boxer APC chassis with the Puma turret and accommodates up to six dismounted troops, according to Moran. 08:31.
• The Schakal vehicle’s features as including firepower, troop transport capability, protection, and rapid deployability. 12:15.
• Moran criticizes the Boxer platform, noting that its large size complicates air transport in planes like the C-130 or A400M and requires disassembling the chassis and module. 08:53.
• Moran estimates that Germany’s A400M fleet cannot airlift a full battalion of Boxers at once. 09:10.
• Moran compares U.S. Stryker brigade combat teams, which are deployable using the U.S. Air Force's airlift fleet, to Germany’s Boxer fleet. 08:53.
• Moran highlights the operational limitations of deploying light and medium wheeled vehicles without sufficient follow-up heavy forces. 09:32.
• Moran critiques Schakal’s cost-efficiency and questions its redundancy alongside existing platforms such as the Puma. 11:12.
• Operational concerns with the Schakal’s high profile, which complicates combat dismount procedures. 10:36.
• The Amphibious Combat Vehicles (ACVs) used by the U.S. Marine Corps can transport approximately 12 troops, compared to 20 in older AAVs. 28:49.
• Moran discusses the impracticality of rushing a larger fleet of heavier tanks into service during the Korean War, given existing logistical constraints. 29:51.
• The historical background of the T95 FV4201 Chieftain hybrid design involving turret swaps between U.S. and U.K. tanks. 30:40.
• The evolution of military vehicle ammunition from canister rounds to programmable high-explosive shells. 33:56.
• The XM30 program represents the U.S. Army’s shift from ambitious designs to scaled-back, practical implementations, according to Moran. 36:20.
• The M1E3 Abrams upgrade aims to reduce excessive weight to meet future combat needs in the 2040s, says Moran. 37:52.
• Germany’s Leopard 2A8 program as an interim solution ahead of the multinational Main Ground Combat System (MGCS). 37:14.
• The decline of traditional cavalry squadrons due to personnel shortages and shifts in tactical priorities. 38:23.
• A new doctrine manual is expected to redefine the role of cavalry in main-body operations, emphasizing informing, protecting, and fighting, according to Moran. 39:13.
• Losing a single high-capacity troop transport vehicle, like the ACV, could result in catastrophic losses for an entire platoon. 27:36.
• Troop carriers may evolve into heavily armed platforms resembling the Merkava tank with limited troop capacity. 26:59.