Examining the Ballistic Missile Resurgence in Modern Warfare

Historical Context and Early Developments of Ballistic Missiles

Ballistic missiles have undergone significant evolution since their inception, transforming from primitive rocket systems to the sophisticated weapons we see today. Perun begins by contextualizing the resurgence of these systems in modern warfare by tracing their historical roots.

He notes that while early forms of weaponized rockets, such as Chinese fire arrows and Congreve rockets, date back centuries, they were rudimentary and lacked the capability and precision of modern ballistic missiles. The German V-2 missile, developed during World War II, stands out as a pivotal development in this history. Although plagued by technical limitations, high costs, and poor accuracy, the V-2 showcased the potential of ballistic missile technology. As Perun explains, the V-2 could deliver a one-ton warhead over 200 miles, and its hypersonic speed during the terminal phase made it nearly impossible for contemporary air defense systems to intercept.

Despite its innovations, the V-2 was not the game-changer that Nazi Germany hoped for. Perun highlights the limited success of this weapon. Though thousands of V-2 rockets were launched, their impact on the war effort was marginal. They failed to consistently hit point targets like dock gates or bridges, and their high costs were disproportionate to their operational results. For instance, the V-2 inflicted minimal casualties relative to the sheer scale of its deployment. Nevertheless, its technological foundation planted the seeds for the Cold War arms race.

In the aftermath of World War II, both the United States and the Soviet Union scrambled to capture German V-2 technology, as well as the scientists and engineers responsible for its design. This marked the beginning of a new era. Ballistic missile capabilities were rapidly advanced, with greater ranges achieved by the late 1950s through platforms like the Soviet R-7 and the U.S. Atlas, both of which achieved intercontinental range. Perun underscores the transformative impact of the space race and missile competition, which fused advancements in guidance systems, solid-fuel technology, and the strategic integration of nuclear warheads.

The Cold War saw the widespread adoption of ballistic missiles as nuclear delivery systems, often equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). These payloads expanded the destructive reach of both tactical and intercontinental missiles. Perun points out that nearly every Soviet short-range and medium-range ballistic missile could carry nuclear warheads, as well as other payload types, including cluster and chemical munitions. On the western side, the United States developed systems like the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), designed for devastating battlefield effectiveness using cluster munitions. Such weapons, while initially limited by accuracy and throw weight, demonstrated their utility as they evolved into dual-role systems for both nuclear and conventional warfare.

Perun reflects on how these historic developments shaped the allure of ballistic missiles, even with their high costs and challenging technical limitations. The ability to deliver a payload, whether conventional or nuclear, over vast distances within a short span of time established these weapons as a cornerstone of Cold War military strategy.

The Strategic Value of Modern Ballistic Missiles

The renewed interest in ballistic missiles in the 21st century stems from their unique operational advantages, particularly for states looking to assert power over long distances. Perun breaks down these advantages and contextualizes them within contemporary military technologies and strategic circumstances.

One of the key strengths of ballistic missiles is their substantial range, which enables countries to strike targets hundreds or even thousands of miles away. Perun highlights Iran's use of ballistic missiles as an example, explaining that such systems allow the country to project power as far as Israel while bypassing the need for costly investments in strategic air or naval forces. Compared to alternatives like long-range aircraft or drones, ballistic missiles provide a speed advantage. For instance, Iranian ballistic missiles can reach Israel in just 12 minutes, whereas cruise missiles may take hours, and drones even longer. This reduced time to target minimizes warning for defensive systems, further complicating interception efforts.

While modern air and missile defense systems have advanced significantly since the World War II era, ballistic missiles continue to pose unique operational challenges. According to Perun, intercepting these missiles requires not only sophisticated technology but also a significant investment in infrastructure, sensors, and training. The sheer speed and trajectory of a ballistic missile demand a level of precision and readiness that is difficult to maintain. Even robust missile defense systems can be overwhelmed by sheer volume, forcing defenders to either absorb the damage or exhaust their interceptor stockpiles in attempts to counter the incoming threats.

One of the reasons for the accessibility of ballistic missiles is that their foundational technology is decades old, making them far easier and less expensive to develop than other high-tech military systems like aircraft carriers or strategic bombers. Perun notes that countries such as Iran and North Korea have successfully developed advanced liquid and solid-fuel ballistic missile technologies despite their comparatively limited resources. These nations have used ballistic missiles as a cost-effective means to offset their weaknesses in other military domains, underscoring the missile’s appeal for countries seeking to bolster their strategic capabilities.

Perun observes that new technological developments are also expanding the utility of ballistic missiles beyond their traditional roles. Advances in guidance and targeting systems have taken accuracy from the realm of kilometers to just meters, making ballistic missiles viable for striking a broader range of critical targets. Using advanced seeker technologies, missiles can now adjust their trajectories during flight, even overcoming challenges such as electronic warfare. This evolution has enabled the development of anti-ship ballistic missiles by countries like China, South Korea, and the United States, representing a significant adaptation of the missile platform.

Lessons from recent conflicts offer further evidence of ballistic missile utility. Perun points to Ukraine as a case study, where both Ukrainian and Russian forces have employed cluster munitions in ballistic missiles for impactful results. For example, Ukrainians used a limited number of ATACMS armed with cluster munitions to neutralize an entire helicopter base, while Russia’s Iskander missiles have been effective against infantry and other battlefield targets.

That said, such systems are not a panacea. Iran’s use of ballistic missiles equipped with cluster munitions during confrontations with Israel had mixed results, causing limited structural damage when faced with robust air defense systems. The effectiveness of these payloads largely depends on their target. Perun details cases where cluster munitions succeeded against exposed military assets but failed in scenarios requiring destruction of hardened or strategic infrastructure.

Finally, Perun highlights the flexibility of modern ballistic missiles in carrying specialized payloads. Concepts like the U.S. Prism system explore using ballistic missiles to rapidly deliver "loitering munitions": autonomous drones capable of hunting and engaging targets individually. While less explosive than traditional warheads, this approach enables surgical operations without risking manned platforms, providing nations with an adaptable strike option for uncertain environments.

This combination of reach, speed, economy, and evolving capabilities helps explain why ballistic missiles are reclaiming attention from nations of varying levels of military and economic power. As Perun explains, their demonstrated effectiveness in conflicts from Ukraine to the Middle East makes them a compelling option in procurement agendas. For many nations, these weapons represent an attractive balance between cost and capability, even in the context of historically advanced missile defense systems.

National Programs and Advancements

Perun begins this section by examining Russia, a nation that has heavily invested in ballistic missile capabilities for decades, especially at the tactical level. Russia's approach to these weapons has played a significant role in its military operations, particularly in the ongoing war in Ukraine. Among its ballistic missile arsenal, the Iskander system stands out as a versatile and formidable weapon. While Russia has developed other systems, such as the air-launched Kinzhal missile, its practicality has come into question due to several shortcomings. According to Perun, the Kinzhal's dependency on aircraft, extended warning times for opponents, and logistical inefficiencies make it less favorable compared to ground-launched systems like the Iskander.

The Iskander missile, Perun notes, has proven to be a game-changing asset on the battlefield. Ukraine estimates place Russia's production rate for this system at about 60 units per month, suggesting a significant ramp-up in production during the conflict. The Iskander is not only used for tactical engagements, such as targeted strikes on high-value battlefield targets, but also in strategic bombing campaigns, creating substantial challenges for Ukrainian air defenses. Improvements in countermeasure capabilities, such as deploying decoys during the missile's terminal phase, have further complicated interception efforts.

Moving to China, Perun highlights the country's distinct strategy in developing its ballistic missile arsenal. Rather than pouring resources into a single system, China has pursued a diverse array of missile types across all ranges, from short-range tactical missiles to intermediate-range and long-range missiles. Notable systems include the DF-26, colloquially referred to as the “Guam killer," due to its range being capable of striking U.S. facilities in Guam, and its versatility in delivering both nuclear and conventional payloads. The DF-26 also exists in an anti-ship variant, adding a maritime dimension to China's ballistic missile capabilities.

Perun contrasts China's choices with Russia's strategy, particularly regarding the use of pod-based systems. Pod-based launchers, which China has adopted for some of its systems, offer flexibility to switch between firing different types of munitions, such as short-range and tactical ballistic missiles like the Fire Dragon 480. In simulations, this missile has reportedly demonstrated an ability to overwhelm modern naval defenses in scenarios involving coordinated attacks with drones. Though such simulations should be approached cautiously, Perun points out that they underline the expanding roles ballistic missiles can play beyond their traditional use.

Turning to the United States, Perun observes a different approach to ballistic missile development, focused primarily on the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM). Designed as a successor to the older ATACMS missile, the PrSM prioritizes accuracy, multi-role capabilities, and efficient use of existing infrastructure, like the HIMARS and M270 launch platforms. Not only can the PrSM deliver strikes with increased range and precision, but it is also part of a broader U.S. military ethos to achieve more significant effects with more compact and versatile technologies. Future iterations of the PrSM, known as "increments," are slated to include enhancements such as increased range, new targeting capabilities, and deployment from autonomous platforms.

Perun concludes by acknowledging that, while the PrSM reflects a streamlined U.S. approach to ballistic missile development, it is not as expansive or diverse as China's program. This is partly offset by the U.S.'s broader range of advanced weapon systems, such as hypersonic missiles and cruise missiles, which complement the PrSM's capabilities. Meanwhile, European NATO members are reevaluating their missile programs and overall long-range strike strategies. After years of underinvestment following the Cold War, these nations are now prioritizing the development of long-range precision munitions. Delegating that capability to the United States during the "peace dividend" era seemed logical at the time, but Russia’s recent aggression has underscored the risks of such dependence.

An example of this reinvigorated focus is a $50 billion European NATO initiative, announced at a recent summit, aimed at developing sovereign long-range strike capabilities. Spearheaded by the United Kingdom, the initiative emphasizes collaboration on technological advancements and industrial capabilities. Perun notes that this represents not only a strategic shift but also a critical step toward reducing NATO's reliance on the U.S. for key deterrence assets.

Interception Challenges and Economic Considerations

Perun begins by highlighting the strategic risks tied to the current disparity in capability among NATO states. He points out that Ukraine, with drones like Flaming Go and Sapsan, may currently have more capacity to strike distant targets in regions like Iran than some European nations. Many European NATO countries lack either long-range cruise missiles or possess systems that are restricted by limited range, survivability, or deployability. This disparity presents a significant vulnerability for NATO's collective defense, particularly in the face of an adversary like Russia.

Perun explains that Moscow may view NATO as sufficient to counter major military actions but could assess that certain individual member states lacking long-range strike capabilities are vulnerable to provocations. This calculus might embolden Russia to test the alliance’s unity by escalating tensions with NATO peripheral states. He suggests that equipping more NATO members with advanced long-range offensive tools could deter such provocations by making Russian assessments of unilateral action untenable. Essentially, these capabilities act as "escalatory tools," making the costs of aggression higher for potential adversaries.

Moving to the industrial developments, Perun identifies that many investments tied to NATO's $50 billion long-range precision-strike initiative are more focused on cruise missiles rather than ballistic missiles. Major NATO missile manufacturers excel in producing ground- and air-launched cruise missiles, with subsonic, supersonic, and even hypersonic options in the pipeline. However, the industrial foundation and expertise for tactical ballistic missile production within Europe remain underdeveloped.

As an example of ongoing ballistic missile development efforts, Perun cites the United Kingdom's Project Nightfall, an initiative aimed at creating a tactical ballistic missile specifically for Ukrainian use. The project’s initial goal was a missile with a range exceeding 600 kilometers, a warhead of about 300 kilograms, and a cost under half a million pounds ($670,000). However, these specifications were revised based on feedback from industry representatives to a missile with a shorter 500-kilometer range, a reduced 200-kilogram warhead, and a unit cost of £800,000 (approximately $1 million). Despite these adjustments and the deliberately simplistic design, even this “affordable” option faces challenges such as a constrained production rate of just ten missiles per month at the start.

In the short term, Perun notes, the UK is addressing its own missile needs by purchasing American Precision Strike Missiles (PrSM). These missiles allow for high-precision ground-based strikes up to 500 kilometers, but because they fall under strict U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), the UK cannot freely transfer them to other countries like Ukraine without U.S. approval. The PrSM procurement demonstrates a reliance on foreign systems that hamper sovereign flexibility, strengthening the case for an indigenous program like Nightfall.

Other NATO members, like Germany, are opting to localize production of American designs. Rheinmetall plans to produce ATACMS ballistic missiles for the first time in Europe, although, as Perun states, these are a generation behind more recent designs. Control over the use of these systems will also remain with Washington.

Poland, in contrast, is pursuing a diversification strategy by simultaneously acquiring American air-launched cruise missiles and South Korean KTSSM-1 tactical ballistic missiles. The KTSSM-1 is roughly equivalent to the American ATACMS, with a 290-kilometer range and various warhead options. There is speculation that Poland may eventually aim to locally manufacture these South Korean systems, but current licensing arrangements seem focused on smaller systems for now.

Perun transitions to Turkey, one of NATO's most proactive members in developing homegrown ballistic missile capabilities. Turkey has already secured exports for its tactical missiles, notably selling a system similar to ATACMS to Indonesia, with deliveries set for 2025. Beyond short-range systems, Turkey’s Tayfun missile provides a more advanced alternative with ranges beyond 280 kilometers. The latest Block 3 version of Tayfun has demonstrated its ability to strike moving maritime targets with high precision, a rare capability for ballistic missiles.

Furthermore, Turkey appears to value scaling up its ballistic missile projects. Perun describes successive iterations of the Tayfun missile, with the Block 4 concept weighing over 7 tons and stretching nearly 10 meters in length. Turkey also unveiled the Sanc missile in 2023, a medium-range ballistic missile with a 2,000-kilometer range target. Even more ambitiously, Perun mentions Turkey’s conceptual efforts toward designing a conventionally armed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

While Perun questions the practical military logic of a conventional ICBM, viewing it as expensive and likely tied more to political motives or civilian applications, he acknowledges that the capacity and intent to develop such systems signal significant ambition. He sees a more grounded rationale for investing in larger conventional ballistic missiles, pointing to South Korea's Hyunmoo 5 as an example of this strategic thinking.

The Hyunmoo 5, with its massive warhead capable of carrying up to 17,000 pounds in one configuration, is a testament to South Korea’s focus on deterrence and self-reliance. Perun compares the Hyunmoo 5 to the U.S. Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) gravity bomb. While the MOP is dropped from high-altitude bombers and relies solely on gravity, the Hyunmoo 5’s ballistic trajectory allows it to reach higher speeds before impact. Although the missile's high cost makes it less economically efficient compared to reusable strategic bombers delivering gravity bombs, its road-mobile launcher and ease of deployment make it an accessible and flexible option for South Korea.

Perun stresses that the Hyunmoo 5 also illustrates a broader trend of nations prioritizing investment in systems that rely on capital rather than manpower, fitting South Korea's demographic challenges. He raises hypotheticals about South Korea’s capacity to develop a sovereign nuclear deterrent using systems like Hyunmoo 5 should the U.S. nuclear umbrella falter, underscoring how such missiles could be repurposed as strategic delivery vehicles.

Moving into global trends, Perun observes that ballistic missiles' role has evolved significantly since the days of the German V-2. Modern ballistic missiles are now integral to what he refers to as the "kill web": a networked system of sensors, rapid data processing, and weapons capable of delivering immediate effects on targets. In this framework, he argues, ballistic missiles share characteristics with hypersonic weapons: costly but unmatched for responsiveness and their ability to bypass defenses.

Ballistic missile capabilities, he warns, are also becoming increasingly accessible, giving nations like Iran and North Korea potent long-range strike options that don’t require the vast resources needed for aircraft carriers or strategic bombers. While these weapons are not ideal as standalone systems, Perun emphasizes that their effectiveness when combined with technologies like cheap attack drones cannot be ignored.

Potential geopolitical implications are complex. While some countries, like South Korea, see these weapons as tools for deterrence, Perun notes that Iran's experience shows this may not always be the case. Furthermore, he suggests these missiles are likely to see increased use in low-intensity conflicts or as tools for coercive, limited strikes, which could redefine norms around the use of force in international relations.

Ultimately, Perun concludes, comprehensive defense against advanced ballistic missile threats is both technologically challenging and prohibitively expensive. Given these constraints, he argues that nations must prioritize sovereign offensive capabilities as a complement to defensive measures. A robust offensive force, he asserts, introduces a critical element of mutual risk that can serve as a powerful deterrent.

What was said, and when

The points this article makes, and the moment in the recording where each was said. Every time below opens the recording at that moment.

• Early weaponized rockets, such as Chinese fire arrows and Congreve rockets, were rudimentary and lacked the capability and precision of modern ballistic missiles. 03:17.
• The German V-2 missile, developed during World War II, could deliver a one-ton warhead over 200 miles. 03:57.
• The V-2 missile's hypersonic speed during its terminal phase made it nearly impossible for contemporary air defense systems to intercept. 03:57.
• Thousands of V-2 rockets were launched during World War II. 04:52.
• The V-2 missile failed to consistently hit point targets like dock gates or bridges. 05:12.
• The United States and the Soviet Union scrambled to capture German V-2 technology after World War II. 05:44.
• Ballistic missile capabilities were rapidly advanced by the late 1950s through platforms like the Soviet R-7 and the U.S. Atlas, both of which achieved intercontinental range. 06:12.
• Nearly every Soviet short-range and medium-range ballistic missile could carry nuclear warheads, as well as other payload types, including cluster and chemical munitions. 07:00.
• The Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) was designed for devastating battlefield effectiveness using cluster munitions. 07:58.
• Iranian ballistic missiles can reach Israel in just 12 minutes, according to Perun. 09:07.
• Modern missile defense systems can be overwhelmed by sheer volume of incoming ballistic missiles, according to Perun. 09:33.
• The foundational technology of ballistic missiles being decades old makes them easier and less expensive to develop than other military systems, according to Perun. 10:05.
• Countries like Iran and North Korea have successfully developed advanced liquid and solid-fuel ballistic missile technologies despite limited resources, according to Perun. 10:32.
• Advances in guidance and targeting systems have improved ballistic missile accuracy to within meters, according to Perun. 12:32.
• Anti-ship ballistic missiles have been developed by countries like China, South Korea, and the United States, according to Perun. 13:13.
• Ukraine used ATACMS armed with cluster munitions to neutralize an entire helicopter base, according to Perun. 13:46.
• Russia has used Iskander missiles effectively against infantry and other battlefield targets, according to Perun. 21:05.
• Iran's ballistic missiles equipped with cluster munitions caused limited structural damage against robust air defenses, according to Perun. 14:12.
• The U.S. Prism system explores using ballistic missiles to deliver loitering munitions such as autonomous drones, according to Perun. 15:06.
• Russia's production rate for the Iskander system has been estimated at about 60 units per month during the Ukraine war, according to Ukraine and cited by Perun. 20:48.
• The DF-26 missile can strike U.S. facilities in Guam and deliver both nuclear and conventional payloads. 25:10.
• The Fire Dragon 480 short-range missile has reportedly demonstrated an ability to overwhelm modern naval defenses in simulations, according to Perun. 27:32.
• The Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) is designed as a successor to the ATACMS system, according to Perun. 28:41.
• Future iterations of the PrSM are planned to include enhancements such as increased range and new targeting capabilities. 29:15.
• A $50 billion European NATO initiative aims to develop sovereign long-range strike capabilities, announced at a recent summit. 33:20.
• Ukraine has used drones like Flaming Go and Sapsan for long-range strikes. 34:45.
• The United Kingdom's Project Nightfall aims to develop a ballistic missile for Ukraine with an initial range of over 600 kilometers and a cost under half a million pounds per unit. 35:50.
• Rheinmetall plans to produce ATACMS ballistic missiles in Europe, though the designs are considered a generation behind newer systems. 38:07.
• Poland is acquiring American air-launched cruise missiles and South Korean KTSSM-1 tactical ballistic missiles. 38:29.
• Turkey’s Tayfun missile provides ranges beyond 280 kilometers and has demonstrated precision against moving maritime targets, according to Perun. 39:49.