The Warehouse War: Ukrainian Strikes on Russian Logistics and Their Impact

The rationale behind targeting logistics hubs

Perun begins by laying out the strategic thinking behind Ukraine's decision to recently target Russian warehouses and distribution centers, including facilities owned by Wildberries, a large e-commerce company comparable to Amazon in its operational model. These strikes, described as employing a "same-day high-explosive delivery service," are positioned as part of Ukraine's broader long-range strike campaign. The focus on facilities like Wildberries' warehouses is not a replacement for attacks on other critical infrastructure, such as oil refineries and military supply depots, but a new addition to a growing list of targets.

According to Perun, Ukraine's attacks on Russian fuel infrastructure remain a priority, with a noted increase in strike frequency, particularly on refineries. For instance, in the first week of August 2026, Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil refineries averaged approximately one strike per day. The effectiveness of these operations is backed by visual evidence, such as satellite imagery of the heavily damaged Osk refinery, which Russia recently confirmed as out of commission for at least six months. Bloomberg's analysis claimed that these strikes contributed to a significant reduction in Russian oil processing, marking notably low production levels this year compared to the previous two decades.

Perun observes that these refinery attacks have precipitated noticeable economic impacts on Russia. Retail fuel purchasing restrictions have been lifted in some areas, but this adaptation does not indicate a decline in Ukrainian strike activity. Instead, it underscores Russia's shifting priorities toward maintaining its domestic fuel supply at the expense of quality and environmental standards. This is further demonstrated by a pivot in Russian energy policy, changing from being a major petroleum exporter to becoming a substantial fuel importer.

In addition to the refinery strikes, mid-range drone and missile campaigns targeting Russian military logistics continue unabated. Perun describes how Ukraine has been targeting convoys of fuel trucks, often supported by security vehicles equipped with machine guns and air defense systems, which aim to mitigate the impact of drone attacks. However, Ukraine appears to have adapted to these measures, conducting strikes on the anti-drone teams themselves to open pathways for further attacks on logistics. This iterative tactical competition marks a dynamic and ongoing "race between the sword and the shield."

Perun notes that the new "warehouse war" is an extension of Ukraine's existing targeting patterns. By scaling up the number of one-way attack drones at its disposal, Ukraine has been able to expand its focus to include new types of vulnerable targets, without de-prioritizing others like oil refineries, logistics convoys, and industrial sites. The extensive use of drones allows Ukraine to challenge Russian air defenses and target high-value infrastructure. This dual approach, stretching Russian air defenses by broadening the range of possible targets while continuing to stress them with numerous attacks, ultimately increases the likelihood of successful strikes.

Turning to Wildberries specifically, Perun explains its position as a massive player in the Russian e-commerce market. Since 2022, as Russia's economy adjusted to Western sanctions, Wildberries experienced meteoric growth, establishing itself as a key part of the Kremlin's so-called "platform economy." Its business model relies on a network of massive warehouses and distribution centers, which Perun identifies as cost-effective yet highly vulnerable targets.

This vulnerability became evident when Ukraine initiated its campaign against Wildberries' infrastructure in July 2026. After initial strikes on large warehouses near Moscow, the targeting pattern expanded to smaller, regional facilities. Footage from these attacks often shows Ukrainian one-way drones flying low and slow before igniting upon impact with warehouse roofs, causing substantial damage. For example, one strike in Samara resulted in a total loss of stock at the facility.

From Ukraine's official perspective, these strikes are intended to disrupt the supply chain of military and dual-use goods. Perun points out that the Wildberries platform included a "Special Military Operation" category, offering items like drones, body armor, and other military equipment. Though the company has since removed the category, some military-focused items remain available under different labels. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has publicly framed these attacks as a response to Russian strikes on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, describing the campaign as a means of targeting supply channels crucial to Russia's ongoing war effort.

However, Perun emphasizes that other factors may also be in play. He notes that taking aim at non-military logistics facilities might serve as a form of retaliation for previous Russian strikes on Ukrainian civilian logistics, such as a notable 2023 attack on Ukraine's postal system. Additionally, the attacks could be interpreted as a possible effort to push Russia toward agreements that would impose mutual restrictions on certain types of targets.

Perun also presents an alternative rationale raised by Ukrainian officials: that striking high-profile, civilian-connected targets like Wildberries could bring the war home to ordinary Russians. If Russian civilians feel the direct economic and social effects of these disruptions, some Ukrainian officials speculate, it might pressure the Kremlin to reconsider its ongoing war effort. Still, Perun argues that historical examples suggest this approach has limited success, as modern industrial economies, including Russia's, tend to absorb such pressures without significant shifts in public opinion.

Instead, Perun suggests the strikes on Wildberries' logistical network may hold more tangible benefits in terms of overextending Russian air defense systems and inflicting meaningful economic damage. Wildberries' extensive and geographically dispersed network potentially creates hundreds of new targets for Russia to defend. Even with sophisticated and dense air defense around major hubs like Moscow, the strain may leave less-protected targets vulnerable to Ukrainian drones. Targets like Wildberries' warehouses are particularly attractive because they combine high economic value with great susceptibility to destruction, often containing large volumes of goods in a single location.

This is essential considering Ukraine's current long-range arsenal, which consists primarily of one-way attack drones carrying moderate payloads and a smaller number of cruise missiles. As Perun notes, the drones, while numerous, are easier to intercept due to their slower speeds and smaller warheads, making heavily fortified targets less practical. In contrast, sprawling logistical hubs like warehouses offer ideal targets for these types of weapons, amplifying the return on Ukraine's aerial investments.

Impact of Strikes on Russian Economy and Logistics

Perun details how Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian logistics hubs effectively exploit vulnerabilities in the Russian economy by focusing on high-value, fragile targets like distribution warehouses. He emphasizes that while warehouses may not be traditional military targets, their susceptibility to destruction makes them strategically important, especially for Ukraine's arsenal of one-way attack drones and Flamingo cruise missiles.

Destruction of High-Value Targets

Perun highlights that Ukrainian strikes have caused severe damage to logistics hubs like Wildberries, Russia’s largest online retailer. These warehouses, designed for rapid and efficient movement of goods, are ill-equipped to handle attacks. From an engineering standpoint, Perun explains, such facilities are often highly flammable, with large volumes of goods stored in close proximity and minimal fire suppression systems. Citing an example from Krasnodar in July, Perun describes how a relatively small Ukrainian strike resulted in the total destruction of a major warehouse. Satellite imagery shows the extent of the blaze, with the majority of the destruction caused not by the initial strike but by the massive amount of flammable materials within the warehouse.

However, not every strike has been as catastrophic. Perun contrasts this with a less severe attack on a warehouse in Kovsk that did not lead to a fire, leaving the facility structurally intact. Despite the variability of damage, many of these attacks have rendered the affected facilities completely inoperable, leaving fulfillment processes for businesses in those areas frozen indefinitely.

Financial Estimates of the Damage

Quantifying the economic impact of these strikes proves challenging, as Perun acknowledges, due to the evolving nature of the attacks. Initial estimates as of early August suggested rebuilding Wildberries’ destroyed warehouses could cost anywhere from $1 billion to $2.2 billion USD. However, these figures account only for the structural damage and exclude inventory losses, which in many cases represent substantial additional costs.

According to a Forbes estimate cited by Perun, stock losses directly attributed to destroyed Wildberries facilities could amount to $2.7 billion to $3.5 billion USD. These numbers are further compounded by additional strikes, leading to even more significant losses as of the publication date. Perun also mentions reporting that Wildberries might have sought $10 billion USD from the Kremlin to compensate sellers and install new air defense systems, though this figure remains unverified.

Knock-On Economic Effects

Perun paints a vivid picture of the broader effects these strikes are having on the Russian economy. Many sellers who lost inventory in these attacks find themselves without recourse, as insurance policies generally exclude damage caused by hostile acts like Ukrainian drone strikes. Compensation from Wildberries, where offered, often falls short of covering the value of goods lost.

As a result, many affected businesses face insolvency. Perun warns that this could cause a ripple effect in the Russian economy. Sellers unable to recover from losses may default on debt, jeopardizing their businesses and personal finances. Those defaults could spread through the network of interconnected businesses, particularly given the role of these supply chains in Russia's e-commerce landscape.

The financial strain is not limited to the sellers. Perun underscores how the strikes have led to increased costs for warehouse owners and distributors, as some operators now demand higher leases to offset perceived risks. Additionally, the price of insurance has risen sharply: Wildberries and Azon have raised their rates for sellers to reflect the heightened risk. Wildberries’ new fees, for example, range from 1.96% to 5.6% of an item’s value but only offer limited coverage in the event of a strike.

These cascading costs are putting immense pressure on businesses already operating on slim margins, Perun explains. As margins shrink or disappear, businesses struggle to maintain operations, which in turn affects their suppliers, distributors, and customers. Even banks face heightened risks as businesses falter. VTB Bank, a major lender to Wildberries, has seen its stock price plummet 31% in the past year, with a 14% drop in the last month alone.

Debt Market Implications

The financial distress has also rippled into Russia’s banking system. Perun reveals that Russian banks, particularly state-owned institutions like Sberbank, are facing growing issues with non-performing loans, such as failures to repay debt. Sberbank's data from June showed 12% of corporate loans and 13% of consumer loans classified as problematic, equating to a staggering $167 billion USD in troubled loans across the banking system. This deterioration is further compounded by the economic shock caused by the Ukrainian strikes on logistics hubs.

Perun delves deeper into Russia's banking challenges, noting that state-owned banks like VTB have limited funds to buy government bonds, despite the government’s reliance on domestic borrowing. Over $25 billion USD has reportedly been withdrawn from the Russian banking system in the last year, leading to a liquidity shortage. This shortfall has reduced banks’ willingness to lend to the government, forcing the Kremlin to explore creative financing methods, such as monetary policies that effectively amount to indirect money printing. While these measures can provide temporary relief, Perun cautions that they carry long-term risks, including rising inflation and compounded financial instability.

The Long-Term Economic Toll

Although the overall scale of damage to Russia’s economy remains finite given its massive size, Perun stresses the significant "economic multiplier" effect of these strikes, which go beyond the immediate costs of destroyed warehouses and inventory. Risk aversion in the market, increased interest rates, reduced access to affordable credit, and the uncertainty affecting insurance and logistics all contribute to a heavier economic toll. He draws a parallel to Iran's attacks on shipping, which disrupted hundreds of additional vessels beyond the few that were directly struck. Similarly, Ukraine’s targeted strikes on Russian distribution networks have the potential to destabilize entire sectors of the economy.

Yet, Perun argues that Russia’s central bank and financial authorities have proven adept at handling such disruptions, employing various strategies to manage financial risk and maintain market confidence. This includes compensating losses directly, absorbing risks via state-owned banks, or inflating away the damage through unconventional monetary measures. However, these responses come at a cost. Russia's already strained budget deficit, projected to be roughly 2.8% of GDP for the first seven months of 2026, leaves limited room for additional financial maneuvers without increasing economic hardship.

Perun concludes this analysis by noting that the Ukrainian campaign against Russian logistics hubs represents a cost-effective form of economic warfare. These strikes may not deliver a decisive blow to the Russian economy, but they impose significant financial losses for a fraction of the resources it takes to carry them out. Consequently, from a strategic perspective, these attacks represent a meaningful form of economic attrition advantageous to Ukraine.

Russian responses to the strikes

Perun emphasizes that the notion of proportionality in responses, where one side retaliates against a specific target type only because the other side struck a similar one, is overly simplistic in the context of this war. He argues that both Ukraine and Russia are engaged in a clash where the overarching goal is to inflict maximum damage on the opponent’s capabilities. If not attacking warehouses or ports, the same munitions would be redirected to other targets.

As an example, Perun highlights Russia's use of its Iskander-class missiles. These missiles, which can strike warehouses, have also been used against battlefield targets and Ukraine’s defense industry. He points to a specific case where the Russians reportedly targeted a factory producing one-way attack drones using a ballistic missile. Notably, he mentions that this was far from the first time Russians attacked facilities tied to Ukraine's drone manufacturing capacity.

This brings Perun to a crucial point about opportunity costs in targeting choices. He explains that the cost-effectiveness of striking a given target must take into account the value of the alternative targets left unscathed. Whereas Ukraine might gain a strategic edge by using its low-cost, one-way drones to stress Russian air defense systems, Russia’s more capable but more expensive long-range munitions could achieve greater results only if used against high-value Ukrainian targets like military-industrial complexes or pivotal infrastructures. Striking soft civilian targets such as warehouses comes with questionable strategic returns when compared to the opportunity cost of leaving other, more critical, targets unharmed.

Perun underscores the vastly different dynamics in the two nations’ air defense situations. Ukraine, reliant on scarce and expensive anti-ballistic missile systems like the Patriot PAC-3, is unable to intercept most Russian ballistic missiles. This makes Ukraine's strategy one of "absorption," mitigating losses and enduring damage while continuing an economic war of attrition against Russia. In this context, even though strikes on civilian infrastructure like warehouses are economically painful, Ukraine may prefer Russia allocate its resources to these targets rather than use them for more militarily significant strikes.

The effectiveness of current Russian strategic bombing efforts is another layer of debate. While the capability of Russia’s missile arsenal remains high in terms of both production and design, Perun believes that Russia has underperformed in "target diplomacy." The Kremlin has missed opportunities to negotiate terms that could provide it strategic advantages, such as targeting restrictions. Despite unsuccessful Ukrainian efforts to broker an energy ceasefire focused on sparing crucial infrastructure, like power grids, Russia has declined to participate in such agreements.

Perun reflects on Ukraine's 2026 attempts to erode Russian refining capacity, which had taken multiple years to generate tangible results akin to reducing Russia’s oil processing capabilities. He notes that a ceasefire on such strategically vital areas would almost immediately allow Russia to begin regeneration. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s reliance on its seasonal power grid makes it especially vulnerable to targeted strikes during winter, when demand surges. This incongruity creates an asymmetric risk, where Russia could exploit ceasefires to its benefit, potentially stockpiling munitions during less strategic periods and later launching heavy attacks during Ukraine's most vulnerable time of year.

This risk is not merely theoretical; Perun points out a previous example from early 2025 when a short-lived energy truce allowed Russia to rebuild its missile reserves, which were promptly deployed in a concentrated campaign once the agreement broke down. Such experiences highlight why striking agreements on targeting restrictions, such as those covering warehouses or energy infrastructure, is problematic. Perun underscores that even if such agreements were reached, they would depend heavily on trust, which is in short supply in this conflict. Each side has strategic incentives to cheat if the opportunity arises.

Looking ahead, Perun speculates that attacks on warehouses and logistics facilities may continue, albeit at a reduced frequency. Russia has been improving air defenses around critical infrastructure, including a 250,000-square-meter Wildberries facility near Moscow that was recently struck despite robust protections. While Ukrainian strikes may become less frequent due to enhanced Russian defenses, Perun posits that even sporadic incidents could continue to serve several objectives for Ukraine. These include tying down Russian air defense resources, disrupting business operations, and contributing to a general atmosphere of insecurity. Should defenses improve significantly, Ukraine may shift its strategy to other target types, only returning to warehouse strikes if new vulnerabilities emerge.

Perun concludes this section by noting that adjustments to logistics systems in both Russia and Ukraine will be inevitable as long as attacks persist. Even if these strikes were to cease, significant economic costs tied to such adaptations are already ingrained in both countries' war economies. Moreover, he adds, other nations with large, vulnerable infrastructure should take note of the implications of these targeted strikes, as they may face similar risks in future conflicts.

What was said, and when

The points this article makes, and the moment in the recording where each was said. Every time below opens the recording at that moment.

• Ukraine's decision to target Russian warehouses and distribution centers, including facilities owned by Wildberries, is part of its long-range strike campaign. 10:15.
• The focus on facilities like Wildberries' warehouses is presented as an addition to Ukraine's broader targeting of critical infrastructure. 10:15.
• Ukraine's attacks on Russian fuel infrastructure, particularly oil refineries, remain a priority, according to Perun. 02:32.
• In the first week of August 2026, Ukrainian attacks on Russian oil refineries averaged approximately one strike per day, according to Perun. 02:32.
• Visual evidence, such as satellite imagery, confirms that the heavily damaged Osk refinery will be out of commission for at least six months, per Perun. 03:35.
• Bloomberg's analysis indicates that these strikes contributed to significantly reduced Russian oil processing, marking notably low production levels this year compared to the previous two decades. 04:07.
• Retail fuel purchasing restrictions in Russia have been lifted in some areas, but according to Perun, this adaptation highlights Russia's priority shift to domestic fuel supply over quality and environmental standards. 05:57.
• Russia has shifted from being a major petroleum exporter to becoming a substantial fuel importer, per Perun. 06:26.
• Ukraine targets convoys of fuel trucks supported by security vehicles equipped with machine guns and air defense systems, according to Perun. 08:33.
• Ukraine conducts strikes on anti-drone teams to facilitate attacks on logistics, marking an iterative tactical competition described by Perun. 08:58.
• The 'warehouse war' is an extension of Ukraine's targeting patterns, enabled by an increased number of one-way attack drones, per Perun. 10:15.
• Ukraine initiated its campaign against Wildberries' infrastructure in July 2026, starting with large warehouses near Moscow before expanding to regional facilities. 13:15.
• Footage often shows Ukrainian one-way drones causing substantial damage upon impact with warehouse rooftops. 14:41.
• One strike in Samara resulted in a total loss of stock at the Wildberries facility. 14:08.
• Wildberries included a "Special Military Operation" category that sold drones, body armor, and other military equipment, though the company removed the category later. 12:39.
• Some military-focused items remain available under different labels on the Wildberries platform. 13:15.
• President Zelensky framed strikes on logistics hubs as targeting supply channels crucial to Russia's war effort. 15:18.
• Wildberries experienced meteoric growth since 2022, becoming a key part of Russia's "platform economy.". 11:52.
• Rebuilding Wildberries destroyed warehouses is estimated to cost between $1 billion and $2.2 billion USD, excluding inventory losses. 24:58.
• Stock losses from destroyed Wildberries facilities could amount to $2.7 billion to $3.5 billion USD, according to a Forbes estimate cited by Perun. 25:16.
• Wildberries sought $10 billion USD from the Kremlin to compensate sellers and install new air defense systems, though this figure remains unverified. 25:38.
• VTB Bank's stock price fell 31% in the past year, with a 14% decrease in the last month. 34:05.
• Sberbank's June data showed 12% of corporate loans and 13% of consumer loans classified as problematic, totaling $167 billion USD in troubled loans. 28:18.
• Over $25 billion USD has reportedly been withdrawn from the Russian banking system in the last year, leading to liquidity shortages. 30:02.
• Russia's budget deficit is projected to be roughly 2.8% of GDP for the first seven months of 2026. 26:39.
• The destruction of a major Wildberries warehouse in Krasnodar was total due to flammable materials stored there, confirmed by satellite imagery. 14:41.
• Insurance policies generally exclude damage from Ukrainian drone strikes, leaving many businesses without recourse. 26:02.
• Compensation offered by Wildberries to sellers often falls short of covering the value of lost goods, according to Perun. 26:02.
• Wildberries' new fees range from 1.96% to 5.6% of an item's value, with limited coverage for strikes. 33:26.
• Ukraine's long-range arsenal primarily consists of one-way attack drones and a smaller number of cruise missiles, which are cost-effective against civilian-connected targets. 45:08.