Ukraine's Military Aid and Equipment Resupply in 2026: Analysis and Impact

Introduction to Ukraine's Military Resupply Trends

According to analyst Perun, the war in Ukraine has been marked from the start as one of endurance. This conflict, where steady resupply of manpower, munitions, and materiel may be more pivotal than tactical shifts on the frontlines, continues to test the logistical resilience of both sides. While much attention has been given to Russia's capabilities and production strategies, this analysis focuses on Ukraine's position in 2026, particularly the evolution of its resupply model and its standing across key equipment and munitions categories.

Perun explains that one significant aspect of the Ukrainian war effort is how its approach to sourcing military equipment has evolved since 2022. Initially, Ukraine was reliant on existing stockpiles of Soviet-era equipment. This approach shifted to depending on imported Soviet-compatible munitions from former Warsaw Pact countries and other global supplies. Over time, a transition to NATO-standard systems began. However, due to the protracted nature of the conflict, Ukraine has now reached a fourth phase, where its domestic production increasingly drives its resupply strategy.

This shift is most visible in categories like drones, where Ukraine has made dramatic progress in building local production capabilities. This change is not merely about substituting imports but also reflects the prioritization of indigenous designs, leading to an equipment landscape vastly different from the early years of the war. Perun emphasizes that this evolution impacts not just Ukraine’s inventory but also its ability to sustain output despite challenges in international supply chains.

Drone Production: A Good News Story for Ukraine

Perun highlights Ukraine's rapid expansion of drone production as one of the most positive developments in its military resupply strategy. Early in the war, Ukraine’s drone inventory relied heavily on imports, but as the conflict progressed, substantial investments and domestic efforts have led to remarkable growth in local manufacturing capabilities. While certain components remain sourced internationally, leveraging global civilian industries, Ukraine has successfully embraced a "made-in-Ukraine" model for many drone types.

According to Perun, Ukraine’s drone production now spans innovative new categories, including interceptors and mid- to long-range strike drones. For instance, he points out the sharp contrast in quality and capability between early improvised drones and modern Ukrainian one-way attack drones. These newer designs feature improved navigation systems, longer ranges, and higher payload capacities, showcasing the technological strides made in just a few years.

Funding has been a critical enabler of this transformation. A recent European Union financial agreement allocated billions specifically for Ukrainian drone procurement. Perun calculates that even a fraction of the EU funding, when applied to small, relatively inexpensive drones, could secure millions of units for Ukraine’s arsenal. On the other hand, the same funding directed toward higher-end attack drones could still support extensive operations, with Ukraine theoretically able to field hundreds of drones daily if needed.

The sheer scale of the drone ramp-up demonstrates Ukraine's increasing self-reliance. Perun cites estimates indicating a planned production trajectory of several million drones per year by 2026. This figure represents a doubling of production capacity year over year. It is a feat that parallels historic examples of industrial ramp-ups, such as those of the U.S. aircraft production during World War II.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense has also taken steps to streamline and optimize drone production. Under the leadership of Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, efforts are underway to consolidate a previously fragmented ecosystem of small manufacturers. While this diversity of private enterprises initially encouraged rapid innovation, Perun explains that standardizing a few designs and centralizing procurement could address inefficiencies and further scale production.

Additionally, Ukraine has fostered international manufacturing partnerships, which serve multiple goals. Collaborations with countries like Latvia, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom have led to the establishment of joint production facilities. These projects not only bolster Ukraine’s drone supply but also increase industrial capacity in NATO countries and shield some of Ukraine’s production from Russian missile attacks. For example, Latvia plans to construct a drone manufacturing facility in close proximity to the Russian and Belarusian borders, serving dual purposes of resilience and strategic signaling.

Despite the gains, Perun underscores ongoing challenges, including uneven distribution of drones across military units and fluctuating volunteer contributions to production efforts. To address this, Ukraine is considering reforms to guarantee baseline drone supplies even to less prominent units. These measures signify both an increasing consolidation of the drone production industry and an attempt to ensure equitable distribution across front-line and supporting units.

Finally, examining trends in Ukrainian long-range drone production reveals the scale of these efforts. Perun notes that Ukraine has set ambitious production targets for long-range one-way attack drones, aiming for tens of thousands of units in 2025 and even more in 2026. While Russian claims of shooting down Ukrainian drones over their territory must be taken with skepticism, the trends in those figures suggest sustained and substantial increases in Ukrainian drone production and use. Perun argues that this large-scale industrial ramp-up, while challenging, mirrors historical production surges, underscoring the seriousness and scope of Ukraine’s commitment to leveraging drones as a cornerstone of its military strategy.

Beyond Drones: The Role of Manned Aviation in Ukraine's Strategy

While drones dominate much of the discussion around Ukraine's military strategy, Perun emphasizes the critical and continuing role of manned aviation in the conflict. Both sides rely heavily on piloted aircraft to execute a range of missions. For Russia’s Aerospace Forces (VKS), this has predominantly involved the deployment of glide bombs to target Ukrainian positions. Russian fighters equipped with long-range air-to-air missiles also pose a severe threat to Ukrainian aircraft attempting to strike back using their own glide bombs or rocket-boosted munitions. Helicopters from both sides play a key role in drone interception and other behind-the-line missions.

Since the war's outbreak, Ukraine's air force has endured significant attrition, losing both aircraft and experienced pilots. Perun cites 2021 estimates from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), which placed Ukraine’s operational combat aircraft inventory at 71 fighter jets (including MiG-29s and Sukhoi Su-27s) and 45 attack jets (mostly Sukhoi Su-25s and Su-24s). However, years of conflict have dramatically reshaped this inventory. Despite losing over 100 combat aircraft, comprising both fighters and attack aircraft, Ukraine has managed to maintain a stable fighter force roughly equivalent in size to its pre-war strength.

This preservation, however, has only been possible through significant adaptations, including the reactivation of stored airframes and the conversion of reconnaissance aircraft to combat roles. A notable example is the Sukhoi Su-24, also known as the Fencer, which has been heavily utilized by Ukraine after being adapted to carry air-launched cruise missiles, such as the Franco-British Storm Shadow. Perun notes that the Fencer fleet has faced extreme attrition, with visually confirmed losses exceeding the initial inventory. The aircraft nonetheless became a vital tool for Ukraine, particularly given its compatibility with heavy air-launched ordnance. Although some of these planes likely remain operational, Perun suggests the fleet could soon be completely retired. Recent Ukrainian acquisitions, including a modest number of French Mirage 2000s, may provide partial alternatives. These jets are compatible with additional air-launched cruise missiles like the SCALP, a potential successor to the missiles deployed from the Fencers.

Smaller platforms have equally borne the brunt of the air war. The Sukhoi Su-25 attack aircraft, often compared to the American A-10 for its rugged battlefield capability, are now a far less common sight. Moreover, the MiG-29 fighter fleet has suffered steep attrition, with confirmed losses surpassing pre-war inventories. Perun links these losses to the risky missions on which the MiG-29s have been dispatched. Beyond air-to-air roles, these fighters have been repurposed for suppression and destruction of enemy air defense (SEAD/DEAD) missions using U.S. high-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARM) and advanced air-to-ground weapons like the JDAM-ER and French Hammer bombs. These operations, requiring intense proximity to the front line, come with high risks for pilots and aircraft.

The precarious state of Ukraine's old Soviet-era aircraft highlights the importance of foreign resupply. However, a recent breakdown in a proposed deal with Poland to exchange drones for Polish MiG-29s underscores the challenges Ukraine faces in maintaining and replenishing its air fleet. Perun points out that despite this setback, Ukraine has shown remarkable resilience by keeping its fleet operational through foreign transfers and its ability to refurbish older airframes.

Perun also addresses discrepancies in inventory counts reported by the IISS and figures derived from open-source data, such as visually confirmed aircraft losses and reported transfers. While estimates for the MiG-29 fleet suggest it has decreased by 23 airframes since the war began, there is some uncertainty when comparing them against other metrics. Nonetheless, Perun concludes that the overall trend is clear: Ukraine’s established Soviet-era combat aircraft are shrinking under sustained losses, with even emergency reactivations and resupplies struggling to reverse this attritional trend.

As the old inventory is depleted, new opportunities have emerged for transitioning Ukraine’s air force toward modern Western platforms. Among the most discussed additions are the F-16s. While some of these planes are aging, Perun asserts that they are proving effective in air defense roles, particularly against incoming Russian cruise missiles. Various nations have pledged approximately 110 F-16s to Ukraine, though most of these planes will be delivered over several upcoming years.

Moreover, Ukraine appears to be pursuing a dual fighter aircraft strategy, eyeing both French Rafales and Swedish Gripens as long-term solutions. The Rafales would offer formidable capabilities, but issues around financing and production backlogs make timely delivery unlikely. By contrast, the first 32 Gripens have been secured in a deal with Sweden that includes 16 older C or D models set for delivery in early 2027, alongside 16 newer E models scheduled for 2029–2030. Notably, Sweden’s Gripen fighters bring specific advantages, including robust electronic warfare suites and adaptability to rough operating environments, which is a critical factor for Ukraine’s airfields.

Perun notes the Gripen package also includes a supply of Meteor missiles, widely considered among NATO's best air-to-air weapons. These missiles could significantly improve Ukraine’s air-to-air capability, particularly against Russian aircraft that currently dominate engagements at long range using R-37M and R-77M missiles. If integrated with advanced sensor platforms like Swedish-built airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) or NATO-compatible ground radar, the Gripen-Meteor combination could pose a serious challenge to Russian combat air patrols and ground attack missions near the front lines.

In summary, Ukraine’s air fleet reveals a mixed picture. Perun underscores that while Soviet-era aircraft are dwindling under cumulative losses, Ukraine is beginning to not only sustain but also enhance its capabilities through Western support and new acquisitions. This transition signifies resilience and long-term planning, albeit with challenges in funding, timelines, and production capacity looming large over the horizon. This shift is a critical part of Ukraine’s strategy to counter Russia’s continued air superiority.

Artillery Ammunition Supply: A Mixed Picture

Perun transitions from the subject of aviation to artillery, which has remained a fundamental element of warfare in Ukraine despite the growing importance of drones. He stresses how essential it is to maintain an adequate supply of artillery ammunition, as the effectiveness of any artillery system is heavily reliant on its ability to be consistently supplied with shells. Even the best artillery is rendered ineffective without sufficient ammunition, and this is a challenge Ukraine has faced throughout the conflict.

According to Perun, Ukraine has continuously scrambled to secure enough large-caliber artillery shells, with Western producers working to rebuild production capacities after years of reduced output driven by post-Cold War disarmament efforts. He emphasizes that the state of artillery shell production presents a "mixed" picture when comparing Russian and NATO capacities.

Russian Artillery Shell Production and Imports

Perun highlights data released by Estonian intelligence on Russian shell production. The figures reveal a significant ramp-up in production with 3.5 million shells produced in 2023, 4.5 million in 2024, and 7 million in 2025. However, these numbers are broken down into specific categories, which help provide a more nuanced understanding:

• 152 mm and 122 mm artillery shells: Around 3.4 million of the 7 million shells produced in 2025 fell into this primary category.
• Mortar rounds (120 mm and above): Comprising approximately 2.3 million rounds.
• Tank and infantry fighting vehicle ammunition (125 mm and possibly 100 mm): Estimated at 800,000 rounds.

Perun notes that this distinction in categories is critical. When discussing Western artillery shell production, reports often focus solely on 155 mm rounds, which correspond to Russia’s 152 mm shells. He underscores that Russia’s increased large-caliber output to 7 million rounds in 2025 demonstrates a significant surge in production capability compared to earlier in the war.

However, the Russian supply chain is not without problems. While it is bolstered by substantial ammunition imports, mostly from North Korea, which Estonian intelligence estimates at 5–7 million rounds and South Korea claims might be higher, these statistics do not take into account declining shipment volumes in 2026. Moreover, there are concerning reports about the quality of ammunition produced domestically in Russia and by North Korea. For instance, North Korean munitions are not highly regarded, and there’s anecdotal evidence of cost-cutting measures in Russian production. Specifically, Russian 152 mm OF-25 projectiles have been observed to use an alternative explosive mixture marked TA20. This cheaper 80% TNT and 20% aluminum configuration has been used in place of the usual 73% RDX and 23% aluminum-powder mix, resulting in significantly reduced explosive power. Sightings of these lower-quality munitions date back to 2024, and the trend appears to persist.

Ukrainian Artillery Shell Production

For Ukraine, artillery shell supply is drawn from three primary sources: domestic production, NATO or Western production, and third-party purchases from non-NATO nations. President Volodymyr Zelensky claimed that Ukrainian industry produced approximately 2.4 million mortar and artillery rounds of varying calibers in 2025. According to Perun, the vast majority of these were likely simpler ammunition types rather than NATO-standard 155 mm rounds. Nonetheless, Ukraine has been making efforts to ramp up production of NATO-caliber shells. A collaboration between Ukrainian Armor and Czechoslovak Group, for example, is targeting an annual production capacity of 150,000 NATO-standard rounds (100,000 of 155 mm and 50,000 of 105 mm). However, the complexity of the manufacturing process and reliance on imported components are expected to limit rapid expansion in the near future.

Third-Party Supplies and the Czech Initiative

Another crucial source of artillery shells for Ukraine has been third-party countries outside of NATO. A notable example is the Czech Initiative, which delivered 1.5 million rounds to Ukraine in 2024 and ramped up that figure to 1.8 million in 2025. Contracts for 2026 currently target about 1 million rounds. However, recent shifts in political priorities within some of the initiative’s funding partners have led to reductions in overall support, affecting Ukraine’s ability to secure sufficient ammunition. Ukraine appears to have shifted its focus under this initiative toward obtaining longer-range artillery munitions. For instance, a recent order from Rheinmetall, based in Germany, included extended-range 155 mm shells capable of reaching targets as far as 60 kilometers away, supporting both operational advantage and survivability.

NATO Artillery Production Efforts

Perun delves into NATO’s artillery shell production dynamics, identifying a sharply varied pace of scaling production across member states. The United States was initially quicker to work on ramping up its output but faced challenges. A new production plant in Texas reportedly encountered technical difficulties, delaying full-scale operations until 2026. Although the U.S. military aims to produce 155 mm shells at a rate of 100,000 per month, it is only halfway to achieving that target as of early 2026.

European nations, on the other hand, were slower to increase production early in the conflict, but their efforts have accelerated significantly in recent years, particularly through initiatives like the ASAP program. For example, Rheinmetall increased its annual production of 155 mm shells from 70,000 to 1.1 million between 2023 and 2026. However, much of Rheinmetall’s output is designed to replenish NATO stockpiles, meaning only a fraction of it is allocated for Ukraine. A newly opened German facility may produce 350,000 rounds annually by 2027, but just 100,000 rounds are earmarked for Ukrainian forces in 2026, potentially rising to 200,000 in 2027.

The broader NATO story, Perun explains, exemplifies the impact of diverse production efforts across many nations. For example, Poland’s target of 200,000 annual rounds might seem modest alone, but when combined with contributions from Czechia, Scandinavia, Bulgaria, and Romania, as well as legacy NATO stocks, the cumulative output becomes significant. The European Union had set a 2025 goal of 2 million rounds per year across its member states, a target NATO seems confident Europe can meet. Combined with production from non-EU states such as the UK, Norway, and Turkey, this creates a notable offset to Russian production.

Supply vs. Demand Dynamics

While the NATO artillery production surge reassures Ukraine in terms of overall output, Perun argues that critical questions remain about the destination of these munitions. A significant portion of NATO output replenishes member stockpiles rather than being transferred to Ukraine. Much of the broader NATO production ramp-up thus supports long-term deterrence rather than immediate input into the Ukrainian war effort. Perun emphasizes that while enough shells exist globally now to sustain or even increase Ukraine’s rate of fire, ensuring that ammunition flows to Ukrainian forces on the frontline, rather than into stockpiles around the world, remains a matter of political and financial resolve.

This supply-versus-prioritization tension typifies the “good news, bad news” reality of Ukrainian artillery shell resupply in 2026. While progress has clearly been made on production, and Ukraine has taken steps both domestically and internationally to diversify its supply, challenges in distribution, allocation, and politics remain significant barriers to meeting its pressing requirements.

Air Defense Systems: Strengths and Challenges

According to military analyst Perun, Ukraine's air defense landscape in 2026 reflects both important advancements and pressing vulnerabilities. German-manufactured IRIS-T SLM systems have emerged as a key component. Ukraine has reportedly received 10 IRIS-T batteries, with six more expected. Perun highlights that units like the Ukrainian 540th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade, which previously operated Soviet-designed S-300 systems, have transitioned to NATO-supplied equipment such as the IRIS-T, taking advantage of their pre-existing expertise. This strategic move allows Ukraine to maximize the efficacy of its resources.

While Ukraine continues to advocate for additional systems, including more IRIS-Ts and NASAMS, Perun describes the current supply as "stressed but sufficient." He explains that the state of defence can be observed through Russian behavior; specifically, the absence of Russian aircraft boldly entering Ukrainian airspace or achieving widespread missile strikes is indicative of functional air defense. For instance, during a recent Russian attack, Ukrainian forces reportedly intercepted 32 of 34 incoming cruise missiles. This represents a success rate claimed to exceed 90% against such threats. While merit should be given to these consistent claims, Perun advises a cautious approach to wartime statistics, noting that even potentially inflated data can offer valuable insights into patterns.

One glaring shortfall in Ukraine's defense capabilities is its limited ability to counter ballistic missile threats. Ukrainian officials estimate their interception rate for these weapons to be below 17%, in stark contrast to their high success rate against cruise missiles and one-way attack drones. Perun emphasizes that Ukraine's limited airborne interception is especially problematic given Russia's extensive use of Iskander missiles, favored for their comparably lower cost and high effectiveness. These missiles are difficult to intercept, relatively affordable, and often used in high numbers. In contrast, the Kinzhal hypersonic missiles, though often perceived as a significant threat due to their advanced technology, are too expensive and scarce to deploy widely, primarily serving psychological and strategic purposes.

Ukraine's primary defense against high-speed, difficult-to-intercept ballistic missiles rests on the American-made Patriot missile system. Although Ukraine has acquired a significant number of these systems, their continued effectiveness is threatened by the mounting scarcity and expense of Patriot interceptors. The cost per missile, according to Perun, is staggering, and current U.S. military support reductions are compounding the problem. He notes that while Ukraine does have access to funding from international allies, like the recently pledged amounts from Australia and Norway, this financial aid is often inadequate to match the steep costs or align with delivery timelines for Patriot interceptors.

In response to this shortfall, Ukraine has pursued creative solutions. One strategy includes leveraging a contract with Germany for the domestic production of Patriot interceptors, though these missiles are not expected to be available before the next year. Another approach involves a "missile loan" arrangement, whereby ally nations provide interceptors from their stockpiles in exchange for new missiles delivered at a later date. Ukraine has also taken to soliciting even small quantities of leftover missiles from international partners to address critical shortages.

Beyond seeking traditional sources, Perun explains that Ukraine is employing innovative measures to counter the growing ballistic missile threat. By deploying decoys to divert incoming fire and dispersing vital infrastructure to minimize damage, Ukraine aims to mitigate the impact of Russian strikes. Additionally, Ukraine has initiated a "counter-missile campaign" targeting the production facilities for Russian missiles, such as the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, central to the manufacturing of Iskanders. While Ukraine has launched some successful strikes, Perun notes that these facilities are heavily defended and remain challenging to neutralize entirely.

Despite these efforts, the imbalance between Ukraine's interceptor supply and Russia's ability to produce ballistic missiles, particularly Iskanders, remains stark. Perun explains that Ukraine has secured a contract to acquire about 100 additional Patriot missiles, but the immense cost of around $10 million per missile and the likelihood of requiring multiple interceptors per target present serious fiscal and logistical hurdles. Additionally, intelligence from missile wreckage indicates that Russia may possess a substantial stockpile of these weapons, producing dozens more each month, further intensifying the burden on Ukrainian defenses.

In conclusion, while Ukraine has made significant strides in upgrading and diversifying its air defense arsenal, boosting resilience against certain threats like cruise missiles and drones, major challenges persist. These challenges are particularly apparent in combating ballistic missile attacks. Perun underscores that these challenges have been exacerbated by a reduction in U.S. military aid and the globally constrained availability of key systems like Patriot interceptors. As Ukraine continues to innovate and leverage international partnerships to address these vulnerabilities, it remains to be seen whether these efforts will sufficiently address the increasing threat from Russian ballistic missile strikes.

What was said, and when

The points this article makes, and the moment in the recording where each was said. Everything below was said by Perun. Every time opens the recording at that moment.

• Ukraine's war effort has evolved through four phases of resupply strategy, culminating in a focus on domestic production. 03:22.
• Ukraine initially relied on Soviet-era equipment and later transitioned to using imported Soviet-compatible munitions and NATO-standard systems. 03:22.
• Perun highlights Ukraine's rapid expansion of drone production as a key development, moving from imported models to domestic production by 2026. 04:19.
• Ukraine has successfully developed innovative new drone categories, such as interceptors and mid- to long-range strike drones. 04:44.
• Newer Ukrainian drones feature improved navigation systems, longer ranges, and larger payloads compared to early improvised designs. 04:44.
• The European Union allocated billions specifically for Ukrainian drone procurement, according to Perun. 05:45.
• Perun calculates that a fraction of the EU funding could secure millions of small, relatively inexpensive drones for Ukraine's arsenal. 05:37.
• Ukraine plans to produce several million drones annually by 2026, doubling production capacity year over year, according to Perun. 09:29.
• Ukraine's Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov is streamlining drone production by consolidating small manufacturers to address inefficiencies, according to Perun. 07:03.
• Ukraine has established international partnerships for joint production facilities with countries like Latvia, the Netherlands, and the UK. 37:14.
• Latvia plans to construct a drone manufacturing facility near the Russian border to increase resilience and capacity, according to Perun. 08:53.
• Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense estimates a planned production target for tens of thousands of long-range attack drones by 2025, with even more by 2026. 11:55.
• To shoot down Ukrainian drones over its territory, but Perun suggests skepticism regarding these figures. 12:14.
• Ukraine has lost over 100 combat aircraft since the start of the war, Perun states. 16:14.
• Ukraine's air force began the war with 71 fighter jets and 45 attack jets, according to IISS 2021 estimates cited by Perun. 16:14.
• The adaptation of Ukraine's Sukhoi Su-24 (Fencer) fleet to carry air-launched cruise missiles such as the Franco-British Storm Shadow. 17:37.
• Ukraine has reportedly acquired a modest number of French Mirage 2000s capable of deploying cruise missiles like SCALP, according to Perun. 18:24.
• Perun links steep losses in Ukraine's MiG-29 fighter fleet to their usage in high-risk suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD/DEAD) missions. 19:18.
• Various nations have pledged approximately 110 F-16s to Ukraine, with deliveries planned over upcoming years, according to Perun. 22:25.
• Ukraine has secured 32 Swedish Gripens, including 16 older models to arrive by early 2027 and 16 newer models by 2029–2030, Perun reports. 25:45.
• The Gripen package for Ukraine includes Meteor missiles, noted for their advanced capabilities against Russian aircraft, according to Perun. 27:54.
• Russia produced 3.5 million artillery shells in 2023, 4.5 million in 2024, and 7 million in 2025, based on Estonian intelligence cited by Perun. 32:17.
• Russian North Korean imports account for an estimated 5–7 million artillery rounds annually, according to Perun citing Estonian intelligence. 33:33.
• Sightings of Russian 152 mm OF-25 projectiles with cheaper explosive mixtures began in 2024, Perun claims. 35:06.
• President Zelensky reported that Ukraine produced approximately 2.4 million mortar and artillery rounds of varying calibers in 2025. 36:28.
• A partnership between Ukrainian Armor and Czechoslovak Group aims to produce 150,000 NATO-standard rounds annually, according to Perun. 37:14.
• Recent Czech Initiative contracts reduced targeted shell supply to 1 million rounds for Ukraine in 2026, Perun reports. 37:53.
• The U.S. aims to produce 155 mm shells at a rate of 100,000 per month but has reached only half this target by early 2026, Perun states. 39:38.
• Rheinmetall has reportedly increased its annual production of 155 mm shells from 70,000 to 1.1 million between 2023 and 2026, with limited allocation to Ukraine. 40:15.
• Ukraine has received 10 IRIS-T air defense batteries, with six more expected, Perun states. 50:28.