Gripen for Ukraine: Strategic Impacts and What It Demands

How Sweden's Gripen Would Upgrade Ukraine's Air Force

According to Justin Bronk, a senior fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, Sweden’s Gripen jet was originally designed to meet its own defense needs against a superior adversary, an environment that mirrors Ukraine’s current conflict with Russia. Sweden had not yet joined NATO at the time, meaning it needed a fighter that could independently defend against a much larger aggressor. This context of Swedish defense planning has made the Gripen an excellent fit for Ukraine's similarly challenging situation.

Bronk highlights that Ukraine's armed forces are a primarily conscript-based military operating from dispersed locations against a larger opponent equipped with advanced systems like Russia’s Su-35 Flanker fighters, SA-21 GROWLER, S-400 air defenses, and sophisticated electronic warfare (EW) capabilities. The Gripen’s design aligns well with these operational challenges, offering versatility, affordability, and resilience. Its efficient operating costs and decentralized logistics model make it more suitable for dispersed and resource-constrained conditions compared to heavier, twin-engine jets like the F-16, which Ukraine has recently begun deploying with moderate success.

While F-16s have provided valuable contributions, including bolstering Ukraine's ability to counter cruise missile attacks, intercept drones, and conduct select offensive operations near the front lines, Bronk asserts that the Gripen will make a more pronounced overall impact. The streamlined maintenance and operational requirements of the Gripen series are particularly advantageous in an active combat zone where resources and personnel are stretched thin.

Bronk adds that the Gripen’s newer E variant, sourced for the Swedish, Brazilian, and Colombian forces, represents the state-of-the-art in this line of aircraft. Ukraine has signed a recent deal for 100–150 Gripen E aircraft, marking a substantial long-term commitment despite initial deliveries not being scheduled until 2029. Meanwhile, the short-term solution lies in the older Gripen C and D models, 16 of which are to be delivered within an accelerated timeframe. Pilots and ground crews are already undergoing training in Sweden, ensuring these units will be operational by early 2027. The shorter procurement and training cycle could play a key role in Ukraine’s immediate airpower needs during what Bronk calls a “pivotal stage” of the ongoing conflict.

Operational Challenges to Deploying the Gripen

While the introduction of the Gripen has the potential to enhance Ukraine’s air capabilities significantly, Bronk acknowledges the challenges that accompany its deployment. Transitioning to this platform will necessitate comprehensive training for both pilots and ground crews. Such logistical demands are not unprecedented, as Ukraine faced similar issues when integrating new air defense systems in the past.

Bronk compares the adoption of the Gripen to the integration of platforms like the F-16. While the Gripen demands less in terms of specific infrastructure thanks to its design for dispersed operations, building the necessary technical expertise and systems compatibility is still a complex and time-intensive process. This includes the incorporation of new technologies and advanced munitions like the Meteor missile, necessitating carefully planned training cycles and technical support from Sweden.

Long-Range Missile Advantages: Meteor's Role

One of the standout features of Sweden's Gripen lies in its compatibility with the Meteor air-to-air missile, a game-changing weapon for the Ukrainian Air Force. Bronk elaborates on how this missile can significantly enhance Ukraine's ability to counter Russian air threats, particularly against Su-34 Fullback jets and Su-35 Flanker aircraft that have been devastating Ukrainian positions with glide bombs and long-range guided projectiles.

The Meteor missile uses a unique ramjet propulsion system, providing continuous power throughout its flight. Unlike traditional missiles such as the American AMRAAM, which rely on a single rocket burn for acceleration and lose speed over long distances, the Meteor maintains its energy over extended ranges, even at high altitudes. This allows the missile to engage maneuvering targets effectively in the terminal phase of its flight.

Bronk stresses the importance of this capability, noting that one of Ukraine’s primary challenges in countering the Su-34 and Su-35 is their ability to operate from high and fast altitudes while launching glide bombs from 60–70 kilometers behind Russian front lines. Once these bombs are released, the aircraft immediately retreat, making interception extremely difficult. The F-16s and Gripens both struggle because they must pop up from low altitudes to avoid Russian surface-to-air missile systems, limiting their ability to sustain the high-and-fast flight posture that would maximize missile effectiveness. However, the Meteor’s superior range and endgame maneuverability can allow it to reach and threaten Russian aircraft in these scenarios, even when launched from a less-than-ideal position.

Another critical aspect is compatibility: Bronk notes that the Meteor cannot be used with Ukraine’s existing Western fighters like the F-16 or Mirage 2000. Consequently, its addition via the Gripen C and D variants will provide the Ukrainian Air Force with a distinct technological edge, potentially pushing Russian forces to launch their glide bombs from areas further back. While this may not completely eliminate the glide bomb threat, it could reduce the frequency and effectiveness of such attacks, especially near critical front-line areas.

Drone and Glide Bomb Threats to Ukraine

Bronk underscores the severe threat posed by Russian glide bombs and drones, highlighting their devastating impact on Ukraine’s defensive positions, urban centers, and battlefield logistics. Despite the attention garnered by oneway attack drones like the Shahed-136 series, Russian glide bombs, which carry significantly larger warheads, have inflicted far greater damage.

These glide bombs, which are launched by Su-34 Fullbacks operating at high altitudes and from up to 70 kilometers behind Russian lines, are particularly challenging to intercept effectively or consistently. They are dropped with tremendous accuracy from high speeds, often causing significant destruction to fortified positions and frontline cities. In many ways, these munitions have caused more damage than the extensively discussed drone attacks, taking a heavier toll on Ukrainian defensive strongholds and civilian areas.

As Bronk explains, the only effective way to counter this threat is to prevent the delivery of these bombs. The introduction of the Meteor missile via the Gripen C and D variants could provide a viable solution. The long-range capability of the Meteor would allow Ukrainian forces to intercept the bombers before they can deliver their payloads. This would require precision timing and strategic positioning, as the Russian jets spend minimal time near the lines, but it would widen Ukraine’s operational counter-strike envelope significantly.

In addition to glide bombs, drones present another layer of complexity. Russia has deployed an enormous number of oneway attack drones alongside more traditional munitions. As Russia increases its reliance on these aerial systems, Bronk notes the strain this has placed on Ukraine's air defense systems, which are already struggling. The advent of a Gripen fleet, with its flexibility and advanced missile systems, could alleviate some pressures while providing the capability to engage aerial threats more effectively.

Ultimately, Bronk suggests that the Gripen jets, particularly the C and D models arriving in early 2027, will be crucial in helping Ukraine adapt to and counter the evolving Russian threat while preparing for a broader airpower transformation with the future arrival of the Gripen E.

What was said, and when

The points this article makes, and the moment in the recording where each was said. Every time below opens the recording at that moment.

• Sweden’s Gripen jet was designed to meet Sweden's defense needs against a superior adversary. 02:05.
• Ukraine's armed forces operate from dispersed locations against a larger opponent equipped with Russia's advanced systems such as Su-35 Flanker fighters, SA-21 GROWLER, S-400 air defenses, and sophisticated electronic warfare capabilities. 01:10.
• The Gripen is an excellent fit for Ukraine’s operational challenges, offering versatility, affordability, and resilience. 02:05.
• Bronk asserts that the Gripen has efficient operating costs and a decentralized logistics model making it suitable for dispersed conditions compared to heavier twin-engine jets like the F-16. 02:05.
• Ukraine has recently begun deploying F-16 jets with moderate success. 02:20.
• The F-16s have bolstered Ukraine's capability to counter cruise missile attacks, intercept drones, and conduct offensive operations near the front lines. 02:20.
• The streamlined maintenance and operational requirements of the Gripen series are advantageous for active combat zones with stretched resources. 02:05.
• Ukraine has signed a deal for 100–150 Gripen E aircraft, with initial deliveries scheduled for 2029. 02:52.
• A short-term solution lies in the older Gripen C and D models, 16 of which will be delivered within an accelerated timeframe. 03:08.
• Pilots and ground crews are undergoing training in Sweden, aiming for operational readiness of the Gripen C/D models by early 2027. 03:29.
• The introduction of new technologies and advanced munitions like the Meteor missile demands carefully planned training cycles and technical support from Sweden. 08:38.
• Bronk elaborates that the Meteor missile uses a ramjet propulsion system providing continuous power throughout its flight. 07:40.
• Meteor missiles maintain energy over extended ranges even at high altitudes, unlike traditional missiles like the AMRAAM. 07:40.
• Bronk highlights that this capability of the Meteor missile allows it to engage maneuvering targets effectively even at the terminal phase of flight. 08:17.
• Bronk identifies a challenge for Ukrainian jets in countering Su-34 and Su-35 aircraft, which operate from high altitudes launching glide bombs 60–70 kilometers behind Russian front lines. 05:42.
• Bronk asserts that the Meteor’s superior range and maneuverability provide an advantage in reaching and threatening Russian aircraft operating from these scenarios. 08:17.
• The Meteor missile cannot be used with Ukraine’s existing Western fighters like the F-16 or Mirage 2000. 08:38.
• The addition of the Meteor via Gripen C and D variants will push Russian forces to launch glide bombs from areas further back, thereby reducing their effectiveness. 08:58.
• Russian glide bombs, launched from Su-34 Fullbacks operating 70 kilometers behind the lines, are challenging to intercept and cause significant destruction. 05:37.
• Russian glide bombs have inflicted more damage than drones, particularly on fortified positions and civilian areas. 04:39.
• Bronk asserts the Meteor missile introduction via the Gripen C and D variants could counter the threat of glide bombs effectively. 08:58.
• The integration of Gripen jets into Ukraine's air force will be a critical long-term upgrade, despite requiring significant logistical effort. 02:05.
• The flexibility and advanced systems of Gripen jets could alleviate air defense pressures while better engaging aerial threats. 08:38.
• The Gripen jets, especially the models arriving in early 2027, will be crucial for Ukraine's adaptation to challenges posed by Russia. 03:39.